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I N T R 0 D U C T I0

Strikes and boycotts have recently demanded much of
the attention of the public and the courts.
aimed at

in the following pages

set forth,

as completely as is

able limits,

is

The object

to determine and

possible within reason-

the American law pertaining to them.

The

English law will be referred to only in so far as it

is

necessary to a determination and understanding of the law
in

the United States.
In England, labor has been for centuries

by statutes,

and much of the law embodied in

been held inapplicable
this country.

to the conditions

regulated
them has

existing in

Scarcely any important cases involving

strikes or boycotts

came before the English courts prior

to the independence

of the colonies.

The early Ameri-

can decisions had scarcely any English decisions to
guide them;

and the later decisions have proceeded

along the lines marked out in
with scarecly any reference
and in

almost entire

the early American cases,

to the English decisions

independence of them.

The influ-

2
ence of the English cases
Rex v.

The Tailors of Cambridge)

slight in

the early case of

(excepting

has therefore been very

and we can afford to ignore them

this country,

as the courts have done.
Although the subject
given it

little

is

attention.

text writers have

old,

The law applicable

to strikes

and boycotts must be sought mainly in the cases.
are comparatively few considering

These

the frequency of strikes,

and are often so hidden away and obscured as not to be
easily

discovered.

Some recent cases

in

the United

States Courts are of especial interest.
It is as conspiracies that strikes and boycotts
have come under cognizance of the law,
shall proceed to treat them.
as conspiracies
under the
aspects

at

We shall consider

common law and

statutes.

(2)

their legal aspects,

binations and associations
this we shall examine all
both state and federal

them (1)

as conspiracies

With their political and economic

we are not here concerned.

them purely in

and as such we

We shall consider
as employed by com-

of workingmen.

In

doing

the leading American cases in

courts.

To trace something of

the origin and growth of the law pertaining to strikes

3
and boycotts

; to show to what extent they are permitted,

and at what point prohibited,

by the American law

to point out the remedies, legal and equitable,
against then,

is

the object

of this thesis.

lm

; and

furnished

4

CHAPTER I.
STRIKES AS CONSPIRACIES.

Section 1.

Definition.

A strike is defined in Black's Law Dictionary to be
"The act of a party of workmen employed by the same master
in stopping work all together at a preconcerted time and
refusing to continue until higher wages or shorter time
or some other concession has been granted to them by their
employer."

The definition given by Judge Allen in the

New York Court of Appeals (Railroad Co. v Bawns,58 N. Y.
582) and adopted by Mr. Anderson in his Law Dictionary
is

:

"A combination among laborers, those employed by

others, to compel an increase of wages, a change in the
hours of labor, some change in the manner and mode of
conducting the business of the principal, or to enforce
some particular policy in the character or number of the
men employed, or the like."
Bouvier defines it as "A combined effort of workmen
to obtain higher wages or other concessions from

their

employers by stopping work at a preconcerted time."

5
Judge Ray in his "Contractual Limitations"says
strike is properly defined as

"A

'A simultaneous cessation

of work on the part of workingmen' and its legality or
illegality must depend upon the means by which it is
enforced and on its objects."
The definition of the term recognized by the labor
organizations of the country,and proffered to the court
by the defendants in the notable case of Farmer's Loan
and Trust Co. v Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 60 Federal
at page 820, was this

: "A strike is a concerted cessation

of, or refusal to, work until or unless certain conditions
which obtain or are incident to the terms of the employment are changed.

The employe declines to longer work

knowing full well that the employer may immediately employ
another to fill his place,
may not be reemployed

also knowing that he may or

or returned to service.

The

employer has the option of acceding to the demand and
returning the old employes to service, of employing new
men, or of forcing conditions under which the old men
are glad to return to service under the old conditions."
This view of strikes is indeed a rosy one.

Judge Jenkins

rejects this definition as "misleading and pretentious".
He declares that

this would be the ideal strike, but one

6
which never existed in

fact

; that the strike of history

has never been free from coercion,
He says,

turbulence

"a more exact definition is

and riot.

; a combined effort

among workmen to compel the master to the concession of a certain demand,

by preventing the conduct of

his business until compliance with this demand.
cessation of work is

but one,

The

and the least effective of

the means to the end ; the intimidation of others from
engaging in
disabling

the service,

the interference

with and the

and the destruction of property,

to actual force and violence,
complishment

of the end,

and resort

when requisite to the ac-

being the other,

and more effec-

tive means employed.
It

is

idle to talk of a peaceable strike

ever occurred,

x

x

x

; none such

A strike without violence

would equal the representation

of the tragedy of Hamlet

with the part of Hamlet omitted."
This view is

perhaps too extreme and will not be

borne out by the facts.
The perception and memory of the learned judge must
have been obscured by visions of Haymarket,
Pulmnan.

Homestead and

The disorders which accompanied strikes on these

occasions filled

his imagination and he w~s unable or un-

7
willing to look beyond them.

A large crowd of dissatis-

fied men out of employment will often breed turbulence
whether

it

is

designed or not.

been all too frequent.

But it

Disorderly strikes have
is

not true that strikes

are invariably or necessarily accompanied by violence or
disorder.

At least one peaceable

strike has come within

the personal observation of the present writer.
City of Ithaca,

with its

merchant tailoring

is

In

two thousand college students,

an important branch of trade.

the spring of 1893 the journeyman tailors struck in
body for an advance in wages.
violence,

no disorder,

the

In
a

There was no threat, no

no demonstration beyond a peace-

able parade by the striking journeymen.

In a few days

the strike was ended by the employersacceding to the
demands of the workmen.
The great cigar maker's strike at Binghamton in
1890 was peaceable,

1

lors associations,
these lines

in

so was that of the dissatisfied taiof New York,

this year of grace,

been many others which a little
The reason
is

just ended as I write
1895 ; and so have

reflection will recall.

why the peaceful strikes

seem so few

because they never attract much public attention

while the strike which has

any accompaniments

;

of disorder

8

like the friendly contests and boyish frolics of college
students, are heralded abroad with great exaggeration
and lurid coloring in the public press.
However much the several definitions may differ in
,

particulars, they are agreed in the chief essentials
that a strike is

(1) the simultaneous quitting of work,

(2) by several employes of the same employer, (3) with
preconcerted agreement,

and, (4) with intent to coerce

the employer.
Boycott Distinguished.

The boycott is a frequent

though not an essential accompaniment of a strike.

Many

strikes partake somewhat of the nature of a boycott

; yet

the two are distinct.

The latter is not essentially a

labor trouble, but is the effect of any conspiracy to
injure or ruin the business of another, by preventing
others from entering into his employment or from patronizing him in his businesswithout lawful excuse.
Lockout Distinguished.

A lockout

differs from a

strike in that it is usually the act of the employer in
forcing his employes to cease labor by closing his works
and locking the doors against them.

The Century Dic-

tionary defines it as "a refusal on the part of an employer to furnish work to his employes in a body, intend-

9
ed as a means of coercion."

The supplement to Webster's

Dictionary says "Lockout is a suspension of work on the
part of employers,
the employes."

corresponding to a strike on the part of
However, a

virtual lockout may be,

and is, enacted by employes when they assemble about the
works or picket them in such a manner as to prevent those
who wish to do so from continuing in the employment.

Section 2.

The first

Early English Statutes.

English statutes

the regulation of labor were the

intended specially for
"Statutes of Laborers"

(23 and 25 Edw. III.), enacted in 1349 and 1350.

They

were the foundation of the system which oppressed the
community for several centuries.

They grew out of the

distress which followed the great plague which had created a great scarcity of laborers and a consequent demand
for increased wages.

These statutes required all work-

men to present themselves with their tools,
market,

in

open

and then to work at fixed wages for whoever

should demand their services.

Twice a year they were

obliged to take an oath to serve faithfully.

Artificers

who absented themselves from their work were to be branded with a hot

iron on the forehead with the letter

F

denoting the falsity of which they had been guilty in
violating their oath to serve according to the statute.
No man or woman was permitted at the end of his service
to depart out of the hundred,
serve or dwell elsewhere,

rape or wapentake,

to

unless he brought letters

patent under the king's seal.

Persons harboring for

11
more than one night a wanderer without such letters, were
punishable by a fine.
During two hundred years these statutes were confirmed, amended and extended in various ways.

The

statute 3 Hen. VI. C. I. (1424)made any attempt to
neutralize or defeat the provisions of these acts, penal
offenses.

The more general statute of 273 Edw. VI.

C. 15, passed in 1548, forbade all conspiracies and
covenants of laborers not to work below certain wages,
and made them punishable by severe penalties.
upon this came the very important

Close

statute of 5 Eliz.

C. 4

(1562)which revised and consolidated a greater part of
the earlier legislation.

This statute fixed the hours

of labor,-- for one-half the year from five in the morning till eight in the evening, and the other half of t he
year from twilight to twilight,-- for various trades and
gave justices power to fix the rate of wages.
Piloring, imprisonment, branding and ear splitting
were the humane penalties prescribed

by these benign old

statutes for the laborer who violated them.
Mr. Sampson said

of these early statutes,

(1 Yates

Select Cases 111) :"These and other stupid acts of oppression are of the same family, so connected in kind that

12

they hang together like a tapeworm.
one but you must pull all

You can not take

with you."

No other general and permanent

act

like that

of

5 Eliz. was passed until the Combination Laws, 40 Geo.
C. 60, in 1800.

3

They declared combinations to raise

wages or to alter the hours of labor to be illegal and
punishable by imprisonment for two months at hard labor.
The same penalty was imposed for interfering with any
person in the conduct of his business and in the employment of his workmen and servants.

Arbitration for labor

disputes is also provided for.
More liberal and progressive views of the rights of
working

men and of the relations between employer and

employed resulted in the passage in 1825 of the more
liberal act of 6 Geo. VI.

C. 129, designed to supercede

all previous legislation.

The modern English doctrine

of the rights of labor and labor organizations may be
said to date from this act.

The complete emancipation

of the English laborer is finally proclaimed by the act
of 38 and 39 Victoria, C. 86, passed in 1875, which
specifically guarantees to labor organizations the right
to combine to do any act in furtherance of their
interests, which would not be unlawful if done by an

13
individual.
For our purposes these statutes are

important

only

as showing, the legal status of the laborer during this
early period,

the effect they were able and likely to

have had in obscuring, creating, or modifying the

common law,

as applied to combinations of laborers.

14
Section 3.

Strikes as Criminal Conspiracies.

Criminal Conspiracies.

Strikes, then, have always been

the result of an agreement,
It is as conspiracies that

combination, or conspiracy.
they concern us here.

The

term conspiracy does not give any absolute warrant of
their illegality.

As Judge Ray has said above, their

legality or illegality must depend upon their objects and
on the means by which they are enforced.
intent

It is said the

of the strikers is always to "coerce" the

employer.

But coercion in its broad sense is not

always unlawful.

A man may be forced or coerced to do

a good and lawful act, by peaceful and lawful means.
It is only when the conpsiracies of the strikers
become criminal that they fall within the prohibition of
the law.
What, then, is a criminal conspiracy ?
Dezman's famous antithesis in Jones' case,
and Ad.

Lord
(1832),

(4 B

star page 345.) defines a criminal conspiracy as

A combination to do an unlawful act, or a lawful act by
unlawful means.

This definition has been adopted some-

times with slight modifications, in most subsequent cases.

15
Judge Shaw has succeeded in defining the offense more
fully

in

He says

:

Com.%v. Hunt

(4,Met.

at'page 123.)

"We are of opinion that as a general descrip-

tion, though perhaps not a precise and accurate defini-tion, a conspiracy must be a combination of two or more
persons, by some concerted action, to accomplish some
criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or
unlawful means."
It has usually been only when strikes have disclosed
the

nature and characteristics of a criminal conspiracy

that they have come under the cognizance of a court of i
law.

There is no doubt that where strikers cause unlaw-

ful injury to person or property they would be liable in
a civil action for damages.

However the impecuniosity

of the strikers and the lack of financial responsibility
in the labor organizations have rendered these actions
usually fruitless and consequently few.

Considering the

frequency of strikes there are comparatively very few
adjudicated cases of any kind, on that subject.

They

have usually been settled by failure and abandonment of
the strike ,

by concessions on the part of the employer,

16
or by such suffering on the part of the strikers and
such loss on the part of the employer,

as to bring the

parties to a mutual compromise.
Occasionally disorder and violence have been so
prevalent,
strikers,

and business has been so obstructed by the
that the public authorities have

to interfere,

been obliged

and the courts have been appealed to for

injunctions, or by prosecutions for Criminal Conspiracy.

Section 4.

Were they Criminal at Comnon Law ?

Whether a mere combination to raise wages was a
criminal conspiracy at Common Law has been a much contro?verted question.
first

The question has its

origin in the

reported case involving a strike that of
Rex v The Journeymen Tailors of CambrIAge 8 Modern 10

This case arose in England in

1721,

and grew out of

an indictment against several journeymen tailors of
Cambridge for conspiring together to raise their wages by
quitting their employme~nt.
criminal conspiracy,
jiudgemrent

They were convicted of a

and a motion was rrade for arrest of

on several errors in

the record.

The court conceded that
employers to quit work,

it

was no offense for

but held that a confederation,

or

17
combination to raise wages by quitting work simultaneousand as such punishable.

ly was a conspiracy,
The court

said

:

"The indictment

sets forth that

the defendants refused to work under the wages they
but although these might be more than is

demanded ;

directed by the statute,
to work,

yet

it

is

not for the refusing

that they are indicted,

but for conspiring,

and

illegal although the matter

a conspiracy of any kind is

about which they conspired might have been lawful for
them or any of them to do,

if

they had not conspired to

The court further held that the indictment need

do it."

not plead the statute,

"because it

is

a conspiracy which

is an offense at Oonrnon Law."
In holding a conspiracy of any kind to be an offense
at Common Law the court relied on the somewhat
ious and much disputed case of the
ers of London,
Starling in
case,

which is

Tubwomen v The Brew-

thought to be reported as Kind v

1 Siderfin 174,

however,

mystera-

and 1 Kebles 650.

proves to have been an indictment

This
against

the brewers of London for a conspiracy to stop brewing a
small beer,
revenue,

thus detracting greatly from the king's

and depauperating

the farmers of the excise,

18
It bad nothing to do with strikes or wages.
The doctrine of Rex v Journeymen Tailors

of

Cambrde, as well as the authority of the volume

(8

Modern 10) in which the case is reported have been
vigorously assailed by writers and jurists both in Engoland and the United States.
Stephens in his "History of the Criminal Law of
England",

(Vol. III p. 209) says

:

"No case has ever

been cited in which any person was, for having combined
with others for the raising of wages, convicted of a
conspiracy at Common Law before the year 1825.

There

is indeed one case, that of the Journeymen Tailors of
Cambridge,8 Mod. 10, which may perhaps be an authority
the other way but this appears doubtful.
Judge Daly, in the case of Master Stavedore's Association v Walsh (2 Daly N. Y.)

commenting on the case of

Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge says

:

"It is not, nor

has it ever been a rule of the Common Law that any mutual
agreement among journeymen for the purpose of raising
their wages, is an indictable offense, or that they are
guilty of a conspiracy if, by preconcert and agreement
they refuse to work unless they receive an advance of
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wages."

He treats the report

of the case as altogether

unreliable.
Wright in his "Law of Criminal Conspiracies and
Agreements," page 42,

(1873) says of the

declaration of

the court as to conspiracies in the case of Tailors of
Cambridge

:

"This general expression was in no way

necessary for the decision ;
reference ;

it is not supported by its

and it amounts to the proposition, which is

negatived by every previQus and subsequent authority,
that combination is per se criminal, independently of its
purposes.

Moreover that the report is untrustworthy

appears from the fact that the reporter makes the arguments as to the case at Cambridge turn on 7 Geo. 1 C. 13,
which did not apply to Cambridge but only to the metropolis. "
After carefully reviewing the English statutes,
cases, precedents and text books from 1200 to 1825,
Wright

says

:

"The result

Mr.

of the whole appears to be

that there is not sufficient authority for concluding
that before the close of the 18th century there was
supposed to be any rule of Comrmon Law that combinations
for controlling masters or workmen were criminal, except
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where the combination was for some purpose punishable
under a statute expressly directed against such combination.

If such a rule is established by the cases

decided since the passing in 1825 of the act 6 Geo. 4, C
129, which have been above considered, this would seem to
be a modern instance of the growth of a crime at

Common

Law by reflection from statutes, and of its survival

after the repeal of those statutes, somewhat in the same
manner in which combinations for certain kinds of frauds
continued to be criminal after those frauds had ceased to
be punishable apart from combination."
This view seems altogether reasonable and warranted
by the facts.
Mr. Wright does not attempt to claim that

it was

not criminal at Common Law to conspire to do an unlawful
act.

There is neither any reason nor any reliable

authority for holding that it was a
act to ask an increase of wages at

wrongful or unlawful
common law and inde-

pendent of early statutory restrictions.

His conclu-

sions do not seem to be inconsistent with the assertion
of 1 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown C 27, S. 2 (a book of
treat authority) that "all conspiracies whatever, wrns
ful

to prejudice a third person are highly criminal
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Ii

at Common Law.

(The italics are ours.)
:
'Common

For further discussion of the early
doctrine see

:

Agreements",;

Law

Wright's "Criminal Conspiracies and
Stephen's History of the Criminal Law of

England, Vol. III ;

Arguments of Sampson and Emmet in

the case of the Cordwainers of New
Select cases 1ll

;

York City, Yates

Com. vHunt_4 Met,,lll

;

Master

Stevedore's Association v, Walsh(Daly 5),Cogley on
"Strikes and Lockouts"

(1894).

Notwithstanding all the adverse criticism this doctrine was expressly or impliedly approved

and adopted

in many English cases.
(Rex v Hammond and Webb 2 esp. 719
5 Esp. 125 ;

Rex v. Salter

Rex v Bikerdike, 1 Moody and Robinson 179

Rex x Eccles, 1 Leach 274 ;
431 ;

;

Rex v Ferguson, 2 Starkie,

Rex v. Bunn 12 Cox. C. C. 316 ;

Cox C. C. 592 ;

Rex v.Dewitt, 10

Rex v.Mawbey, 6 Term Rep. 619.)

It was the early rule in the United States ;

but

owing to the different circumtances, and the greater
freedom of labor in this country, the doctrine

was soon

limited and softened in its application.
The American cases which are based upon the common
law doctrine, we shall now proceed to consider.

;
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Section 5.

Early American Cases,

at Common Law.
Boot and Shoe Makers of Philadelhpha.

The earliest

reported case in America is the trial of the Boot and
Shoe Makers
City in 1806,

of Philadelphia,

in the Mayor's Court of that

Recorder Levy presiding.

The report of

the case was published in form of a pamphlet which has
become very scarce,

and I am indebted to Carson's

"Law

of Criminal Conspiracies and Agreements" for facts of
this case and the Pittsburg Cordwainer's
The indictment contained three counts.
the defendants,

who were

case below.
The first charged

journeymen cordwainers,

with

having conspired to raise the usual wages paid them and
others in their art by refusing to work for such rates,
and by demanding in

future an advanced rate in

with a specified schedule of work and wages.

accordance
The second

count charged them with having agreed, by menaces, threats
and other unlawful means,

to prevent others

in their art

from working except at the rate of wages fixed by them.
The third count charged that they had conspired to form
a club or combination,

and had adopted rules and by-laws

binding themselves and others not to work for any master
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who should employ any workman who had bro1ten any of the
rules,

and that they would by threats,

intimidation;, and

otherwise prevent any other workman or journeyman from
After setting forth overt

working for such master.

concluded to the damage of the mas-

acts,

the indictment

ters,

to the citizens of the commonwealth generally,

and

to the great damage and prejudice of other journeymen in
the art of cordwaining,

to the evil example of others,

and

against the peace and dignity of the commonwealth.
The Recorder in his charge to the jury,

after re-

marking on the natural effect of supply and demand on the
price of labor,

and the hardships which the conduct of the

defendants brought to the ccmmunity,
digent defendants
strikers

in

"What

themselves,

and to the more in-

and on the conduct of the

forcing others to join their society,
is

workmen to

the case now before us ?

said

A combination of

raise their wages may be considered in a two-

fold point of view , one is to benefit themselves, and
the other
%%ho is
ety.

to injure those

do not join their soci-

The rule of law condemns both.

greatest authority in

Hawkins,

the

the criminal law says that a com-

bination to maintain another,
lar object,

:

in

carrying out a particu-

whether true or false,

is

criminal.

The
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authority cited from 8 Mod. Rep.

does not rest merely
It is adopted by

upon the reputation of that book.

Blackstone, and is laid down as law by Lord Mansfield in
1793, that an act innocent in an individual,
criminal

by a confederacy to effect

is rendered

it.

"One man determines not to work under a certain
price and it may be individually the opinion of all.

In

such a case it would be lawful for each to refuse to do
so ; for if each stands alone, each may withdraw from his
determination when he pleases.

In the turnout last fall,

if each member of the body had stood alone, fettered by
no promises to the rest, many of them might have changed
their opinion as to the wages and gone to work ; but it
has been given to you in evidence that they were bound
down by their agreements, and pledged by mutual engagements to persist in it, however contrary to their own
judgment.

The continuance in improper conduct may there-

fore well be attributed to the combination."

The de-

fendants were convicted.
Peolev. Melvin.

In 1809, the first case in New

York State, involving the question of a strike, came
before the Mayor's Court of New York City, in the form
of an indictment of several journeymen cordwainers of
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The case is

New York City.
in

2 Wheeler's

Or.

reported as People V. Melvin
The indictment charged

262.

Cases,

a conspiracy of the journeymen cordwainers,

with the

features of an unlawful club, rules and by-laws, for the
or to let

; a refusal to work,

purpose of raising wages
others work

; threats and a conspiracy to prejudice and

impoverish,

by indirect means,

master shoe-makers,

to

compel other workmen to follow their rules, or, in case
they had broken the rules, to prevent their obtaining employment in their art.
A motion to quash the indictment was made on the
ground that the combination charged had never been held
to be criminal at common law,

even in England

; and that

such indictments were had in England by virtue of the rigforce in

the

The motion was ably argued before

the

id statutes of laborers, which were not in
United States.

Mayor by such brilliant

counsel as Griffin and Ermet

for

the people,

and Messrs Sampson and Colden for the defend-

ants.

the witty and learned

(See

gilve:n in

full

worth perusal.)

in

argument of Sampson

Yates Select Cases,
However,

111.

It

is

well

the Mayor died before rendering

his decision on the motion ; and,

as the counsel did not

wish to undergo the labor of a re-argument

before his

26
successor, the motion was waived, and the defendants went
to trial and were convicted.

In passing sentence, the

mayor said the object of the conviction was rather to admonish than to punish, advised them to alter and modify
their rules and their conduct so as not to incur the future penalties of the law.

Each was fined a dollar

with costs
The mayor charged the jury that it was sufficient to
constitute the crime of conspiracy if there had been a
combination either to do an unlawful act, or a lawful
act, by unlawful means.

He pointed out that the means

employed by the defendants had been arbitrary, coercive
and unlawful, but he expressly abstained from deciding
whether an agreement not to work, except for certain wages, would amount to the offense of conspiracy, without
any unlawful means being taken to enforce it.
Pittsburg Cordwainers' Case.

At the trial of the

Pittsburg Cordwainers, at the borough of Pittsburg, in
1815, Judge Roberts endorses the language of Chitty that
"All confederacies wrongfully to prejudice another are
misdemeanors at common law, whether the intention is to
injure his person, his property or his character."

In

his charge to the jury he indicated that the indictment
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was not to be considered as a controversy between workand he laid down several propo-

men and their employers,

sitions which are still sound law in the United States.
He said :

a prosecution to preserve the public

is

"It

peace and to protect your fellow citizens

in the quiet

enjoyment of their property and the uninterrupted pursuit
With the regulation of wages

of their lawful business.
you have nothing to do.

It has been truly said that

every one has the right to affix whatever price he pleases
to his labor.

It

is

not for demanding high prices that

these men are indicted,

but for employing unlawful means

to extort those prices

; for using means prejudicial to

the coninunity,

x x x x x

A conspiracy to compel an em-

ployer to have only a certain description of persons
It

indictable.
citizen.

It

and create a

is

a subversion of the liberty of the

has a direct tendency to restrain trade
monopoly.

A conspiracy to restrain a man

from freely exercising his trade or profession in
ticular place

is

Brightly's Reports
next authority.

a par-

indictable."

Commonwealth v.

spiracy,

is

Carlisle.
(Pa.)

It

is

being the first

36,

Corn. v.

Carlisle,

which arose in

1821,

is

the

a leading case on the law of conto be decided in a court of last
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resort in this country, and being illuminated by the wellIt does

considered opinion of the able Judge Gibson.

not, however, directly involve the question of strikes,
employers

instead of workmen being the defendants.

therefore in point here only as indicating
law as to combinations to regulate wages.

It is

the general
The case was

brought before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on writ
of habeas corpus.

It appeared that the relators were

master shoemakers and that they had agreed with each other
not to employ any journeyman who would not consent to
work for reduced wqges

; but it also appeared that the

object went no farther than to re-establish certain rates
which had prevailed some months before, and from which
there was reason to believe the employers had-been compelled to depart by a combination of the workingmen..
A motion to discharge was argued on the ground that
a combination to regulate wages
mon law of Pennsylvania.

is no offense by the com-

It was held that a combination

is criminal when it has a necessary tendency to prejudice
the public, or to oppress individuals, by unjustly subjecting then to the power of the confederates.

Judge

Gibson said :"In no book of authority has the
precise point before me been decided.

Rex. v. The Tai-
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lors of Cambridge is found in a book(8Mod. 10,) which
can claim nothing beyond the intrinsic evidence of reason
and good sense apparent in the cases it contains."

He

reviews the preceding American cases given above, showing their inapplicability to the case at bar.
tinues, "There are,

He con-

indeed, a variety of British prece-

dents of indictments of journeymen for combining to raise
their wages, and precedents rank next to decisions as evidence of the law ; but it has been thought sound policy
in England to put this class of the cammunity under such
severe restrictions, by statutes that were never extended
to this country

,

that we ought to pause before we accept

their law of conspiracy, as respects

artisans, which may

be said to have, in some measure, indirectly received its
form from the pressure of positive enactment, and which
therefore may be entirely unfitted to the condition and
habits of the same class here."
He reviews briefly the history and nature of the
crime of conspiracy ; argues that a combination merely
as such is not illegal, and that the motive for combiniing
or the nature of the object to be attained, as a result
of the lawful act,
He says

is the discriminative circumstance.

•"There the act is lawful for the individual,
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it

to benefit

only where the object is

cert,

con-

when done in

can be the subject of conspiracy,

the conspira-

to the prejudice of the public or the oppression of

tors

individuals,

and where such prejudice and oppression is

the necessary consequence of the combination."

Several

illustrations are given and the judge concludes
then,

take it,

a combination is

criminal,

:

"I

wherever the
the

act to be done has a necessary tendency to prejudice
public

or to oppress

individuals,

by unjustly subjecting

them to the power of the confederates,
to the purposes of the latter
mischief.

Accordi

whether

and giving effect
of extortion or

to this viewof the law a combina-

tion of employers to dpress the wages of journeym
low what they should be if
artificial

there were no recurrence

means by either side,

to

is criminal."

Twenty-four Journeymen Tailors' Case.
laid down by Judge Gibson in

be-

Com V.

Carlisle,

The doctrines
were re-

viewed with approval in the famous trial of the Twentyfour Journeymen Tailors
phia,

in

1827.

in the Mayor's Court of Philadel-

The pamphlet in which the case w~s pub-

lished has become very scarce,

and I am indebted to

Mr.

on t onspiracy" for an ab-

Carson's addeiida to"Wri'ht

stract of the case.
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The indictment charged the journeymen tailors with :
1.

Conspiracy to raise their wages,

their own interests,

and to lessen the profits and injure

of their employers,

the interests

and promote

the master tailors.

Conspiracy to compel employers to reinstate

2.

certain persons whom they had discharged for demanding
higher wages

than the masters alleged they had agreed

to pay.
3.

Conspiracy to injure,

the masters in
4.

embarrass and obstruct

their lawful business.

A general conspiracy to injure and oppress

certain journeymen tailors and master workmen who were
not parties to the original agreement,
combination.

The means adopted were

from work.
workmen in

(2)

or of the general
:

(1) Desisting

Assembling in the streets, obstructing

the employ of the masters,

using threats and

promises to induce them to leave it, pursuing one, assaulting another,

and sending a threatening letter

to a

third.
The Recorder,
to the jury,

Hon.

Joseph Reed,

in an able charge

points out the two points of view in which

the offense of conspiracy may be considered
where there is

; the one,

a combination to do an act unlawful in
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itself, to the injury of an individual, or of the public
the other, where the act done, or the object of it was
not unlawful, but unlawful means were used to accomplish
it.

He explained that the term injury, as applied to

an individual must be taken with some qualification, and
not be considered as meaning such an injury to the
pecuniary interests of another as might arise from the
successful competition of others in the same occupation,
or from other obvious and natural causes.

The recorder

refused to accept the English decisions, rejected as
vague and unsatisfactory the language of Judge Roberts in
the Pittsburg case, "that when divers persons confederate
by indirect means to prejudice .a third person, it is a
conspiracy," and expressly adopted the law as stated in
Com. v. Carlisle, sur,

with the explanation that he

could not suppose Judge Gibson to have intended "by artificial means" to include an agreement among the parties
not to work for less wages than they had agreed to accept.
But-he says

:

"If there was an agreement among the

jour-

neymen to operate on other parties, on innocent third
parties, not privy to the original contract, disolaiming
its fancied benefits and unwilling to incur its perils,
such an agreement would no doubt be criminal,

especially
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if

carried into execution."

acts,

he states that if

After reviewing the overt

there was a difference

as to the construction of the contract
and employers,
to work,

and the parties to it

or the other to employ,

say that an agreement
it

"I

of opinion

between journeymen

had refused,

the one

am not prepared to

to that effect

in

either,

provided

did not extend beyond themselves would be illegal."

The

case is

summed up in

the following words .

"These young men have an undoubted right, by agreement among themselves,

to regulate their own conduct,

ask as much as they please for their services,

to

to continue

or to leave the services of any employer, as reason, inclination,

or caprice should dictate;

but

interfere with the rights and privileges
equally valuable and sacred,
prosecution,

as those,

these defendants

they(their acts)

are criminal,

the moment they
of others,

which,

in this

so jealously contend for,
and. if

the means employed

be combination, they become conspirators."
e v, Trequier.

P
quiet

and others,

City Hall,

( 1 Wheeler's Cr.

New York,

journeymen hatters,

n the case of People v.

1823,

C.,

142)

the defendants,

tried in

who were

were convicted on an indictment

conspiracy to ccompel their employer

Tre-

for

to dis charge a workman

34who had worked for wages below those sought
tablished by the combination.
master hatmakers,

It

the employers,

appeared that

the

had entered into an

agreement to "knock down wages",
this reduction the defendants

to be es-

and in

order to oppose

and others had formed a

society and agreed not to work under a certain price.
To sustain this price,
employer

they refused to work for their

unless he should discharge

prosecutor,

another workman,

the

who had not conformed to the rules of the so-

ciety.
In reply to the claims of the defendants
society was necessary to counteract
sociation of the employers,
spiracy cannot

the force of the as-

justify another.

furnishes-no

However

objectionable

it

is

certain

somewhat at variance with the view

expressed by Judge Gibson in Com.

v.

Carlisle,

su

a,

the accused can show that the object was not to

give an undue value to labor,

but to foil their antago-

nists in an attempt to assign to it,
means,

con -

excuse to the defendants."

This doctrine is

that "if

"One

the court said :

the conduct of the master hatters may be,
that it

that their

a value which it

by surreptitious

could not otherwise have,

will make out a good de fense."

they
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A distinguishing feature of the cases
viewed is

thus far re-

that they involve coercive measures

those who were strangers to the combination.

against
It

was in-

sisted that not only the masters against whom the strike
was declared,

but also the workmen who were not members

of the association,

should submit to the regulations of

the confederates.

These cases are uniform in

that combinations

holding

thus to interfere with the rights and

liberty of others and to coerce them into obedience,

are

unlawful conspiracies under the common law.
A second and distinct class of cases takes a more
liberal view on the questions of combinations.
uphold the legality of associations

They

to maintain or ad-

vance wages by rules binding on the members of the associ&
tion and not designed to coerce third parties.
Commonwealth v.

Hunt.

this class is Com. v. Hunt

A leading illustration of

( 4 Metcalf, 111), tried be-

fore the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1842.
case

is

decided,

not important

The

on account of the point actually

for the decision turned mnainly oni the defects of

the indictment

in

omitting to charge sufficiently as to

the unlawful means employed.

It

is

chiefly valuable
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for the progressive views expressed by the learned Chief
Justice Shaw..,

in his elaborate opinion as to the right

of workmen to associate

and combine for certain (lawful)

purposes.
The defendants in Com. v. Hunt were journeymen shoemakers and were tried on an indictment for forming themselves into a society

,

and agreeing not to work for any

person who should employ any journeyman or other person
not a member of that society, after notice given him to
discharge such workman.
After reviewing the English common and statutory law
of conspiracies and the cases
ed,

in which it had been enforc-

and pointing out the limited application of that law

to similar cases in this country, Judge Shaw said :

"The

manifest intent of this association is to induce all
those engaged in the same occupation to become members
of it.

Such a purpose is not unlawful.

It would give

them a power which might be exerted for useful and honor-

able purposes, or for dangerous and pernicious ones.
x x x x

Such an association might have been used to

furnish eac a other assistance in times of. poverty, sickness and distress

; or to raise their intellectual, moral

and social conditions,

or to make

improvement

in

their
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Or the association may

art or for other lawful purpose.

be designed for purposes of oppression and injustice.
But in order to charge all those who become members of
an association with the guilt of a criminal conspiracy
that the actual if not

it must be averred and proved

the avowed, object of the association was criminal."
The learned judge goes on to enunciate and illustrate
the right of workmen to work, for whom they please, and,
further, to agree together to exercise theit acknowledged
rights in such a manner as best to subserve their own
interests.

But he continues. "We do not understand from

the court in this indictment that the agreement was that
the defendants would refuse to work for an employer,

to

whom they were bound by contract for a certain time,
in violation of that contract

; nor that they would in-

sist that an employer should discharge a workman engaged
by contract for a certain time,
contract.

.

.

in violation of that

If a

large

number of

men engaged for a certain time should combine

together

to violate their contract and quit their employment together it would present a very different quest ion."
The defendants were acquitted on the ground that the
indictment did not sufficiently charge that force,

in-
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timidation or other unlawful means had been employed to
carry out the objects of what was held to be a lawful
combination.
To the same effect

is--Master Stevedore's

Associa-

tion v.Walsh, (2 Daly 5), a New York case given below.
See also State v. Donaldsonbelow.
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Section 6.

Later Cases under the Common Law.

The preceeding cases my be said to have defined and
established the common law in
and Pennsylvania,

New York,

Massachusetts,

as applicable to combinations and

conspiracies to raise wages or to alter the conditions
labor.

The decisions,

in

later cases in

of

these states

were usually determined by statutes defining and regulatLater cases define and apply the

ing conspiracies.
Coimon Law in

other states.

State v. Donaldson :
laid down in

The common law in New Jersey is

State v.Donaldson,

(3 Vroom,

151),

1867.

The case was decided the same year as Master Stevedore's
Association v.

Walsh, below, and the nature of the

association was practically the same as in that
but the element

case

;

of coercion of third parties seems to

have influenced the decision.

Here it was held to be an

indictable conspiracy for several employes to combine and
notify their employer,
other workmen,

that

unless he discharged

they would quit his employment in

There were at the time this case arose,
New Jersey,

similar to those in

combination in

New York,

certain
a body.

statutes in
forbidding any

re straint of trade and coninerce

;

but the
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court thought that the injury to trade in
too remote to warrant
and, grounded its
which it

this case was

an indictment under the statute,

decision on the conmon law of conspiracy

held not to have been abrogated by the statute.

In concluding his opinion, Judge Besely said of
Com.

v,Hunt su_,

that he concurred entirely,

with the principles laid down in
result obtained ;

as well

the opinion as with the

but he distinguished that case on the

ground that the object of the club,

against which the

court refused to sustain the indictment

in that

case was

to establish a general rule for the regulation of its
members

;

while the object of the combination now

before the court was to occasion a particular result
which was mischievous, and by means which were oppressive.

State v. Stewart
is

the leading- recent

:

State v. Stewart

et al (59 Vt.

273)

case decided on the principles of

the common law of conspiracies as applicable to strikes.
It

came before the Supreme Court of Vermont in

motion to quash an indictment

1887 on a

against the defendants for

conspiracy to hinder and prevent the Ryegate Granite
Works from employing certain granite cutters , and for
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hindering certain laborers from working for the said
The means alleged were threats,

corporation.

tion and violence,
It

intimida-

which were unlawful under the

was held that

statute.

such a combination was a conspiracy

And further that the subject matter of

at common law.

the offense being the same in this country as in England;
namely,

an interference with the property rights of
and a restraint upon the lawful prosecu-

third persons,

tions of their industries as well as an unlawful control
over the free use and employment
personal skill

and labor,

by workmen of their own

at such times,

and for such persons as they please,

for such prices

and that the common

law of England is

"applicable to our local situation and

circumstances"

this regard

in

and was therefore the

common law of Vermont.
The court said :
cases,

English and American proceed,

has a right

to employ his talents,

as he pleases,
if

"The principle upon which the
is,

that every man

industry and capital

free from the dictation of others

;

two or more persons combine to coerce his choice

this behalf,
skill

it

is

a criminal conspiracy.

of the workman,

be it

and
in

The labor and

of high or low degree,

the
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plant of the manufacturer,
investments of
If

comnerce,

the equipment of the
are all

in

farmer, the

equal sense property,

men by overt acts of violence destroy either,

guilty of crime.

they are

The anathemas of a secret organization

of men combined for the purpose of controlling the

indus-

try of others by a species of intimidation that works
are quite as danger-

upon the mind rather than the body,
ous,

and generally altogether more effective,

of actual violence.

than acts

And while such conspiracies nmy

give the individual directly affected by them a private
right of action for damages,
basis for indictment
is

they at the same time lay a

on the ground that the state itself

directly concerned in

the promotion of all

industries and the development

of all

owes the duty of protection to its
the exercise of their callings.

legitimate

its resources,

and

citizens engaged in
The good order, peace

and prosperity of the state are directly involved in

the

question."

Cases at Common Law .

For further discussion and

application of the common law in America see:
State v Buchanan 5 Hor.

and J.

(Md.)

534;@
Com.

v Haines,

15 Phila.

(Pa.)

356 ;

317 ;

9 Am.

Dec.

A

Com.

v. Curren,

3 Pitts.

State v. Dyer, 128 Mass.

(Pa)

143 ;

70 ;

Walker v. Cronin,107 Mass. 555
Johnston Harvester Co.
393 ;

;

v. Meinhardt, 9 Abb.

N. Cas.

24 Hun 489 ;

State v Wilson, 30 Conn. 507
Alderman v. People,

4 Mich.

414

;

People v. Petheram,64 Mich. 252 ;
Collins v. Hayte, 50 Ill.

337 also

Spies v. People 122 Ill,1
People v Fisher,

14 Wend.

;

50 Ill.

353

3 Am. St. Rep. 320.
9

;

Master Stevedore's Ass. v Walsh, 2 Daly (N. Y.) 5.;
Rogers v Evarts,

17 N. Y.

St.

Rep.

264.

(N.

Y.)
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Chapter II.
STRIKES AS CONSPIRACIES UNDER STATUTES 4
Section I.

State Statutes Affecting Strikes.

No state in the United States has any statute prohibiting strikes, as such.

Many of them, however, have

statutes defining unlawful conspiracies prohibiting
certain conspiracies to interfere with the rights,
liberty or property of others ; or to injure trade or
business.
Many of the states have statutes prohibiting the
use of force,

threats or intimidation by either employers

or employes.
It is usually by the use

of these unlawful means

that the strikers have brought their actions within the
purview of the statutes.
The New York statutes define what combinations are
criminal

conspiracies

Section 168,
Code provides that
(1)

subo.
if

and abrogate

the common law.

5 & 6 of the New York Penal
two or more persons conspire either

To pervent another from exercising any lawful trade

or calling,

or doing any lawful act,

intimidation,

by force,

threats,

or by interfering or threatening to interfere
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with tools, implements or property belonging to, or used
by another ; or

(2)

To commit any act injurious to the

public health, to public morals or to trade or commerce,
x

x

x

each of them is guilty of a misdemeanor.

But Section 170, subc. 2, protects labor organizations
by providing, "That the orderly and peaceable assembling
or co-operation of persons employed in any calling, trade
or handicraft, for the purpose of obtaining an advance
in the rate of wages or compensation, or if maintaining
such rate,is not a conspiracy.
Alabama, Connecticut,

Colorado, Georgia, Illinois,

Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, N. Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, S. Caroliaa, S.Dakotg,
Texas, Vermont, W.Virginia, and Wisconsin have statutory
prohibitions against intimidation quite similar to those
of Sec.

168 of the New York Penal Code.

Cases Under State

Section 2.

Statutes.

People v.Fisher

The first

important

on an indictment under the statutes
was that of People v.Fisher,
Supreme Court

in

in

case to arise

New York state

(14 Wendell,9), tried in

1835.

The defendants were journeymen shoemakers
N. Yo
(l)

the

They entered into an agreement

at Geneva,

and combination,

That if any journeyman shoemaker, whether a

member

of the society or not should make boots for a compensation below an established rate,
of $1.00,

he should pay a penalty

for the use of the association ; and (2) that

if any master shoemaker employed any such journeyman who
had violated their rules,
ment.

they would quit his employa-

One Pennoyer broke the rules of the

society by

making boots for a master named Lum for less than the
established rate,
afterwards

and refused to pay the penalty.

entered the employ of Lum,

and the defendants,

in pursuance of their agreement, quit his employment.
C. J.

Savage in

association

an elaborate opinion,

He

held such an

to be a violation of the revised statutes
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making it a misdemeanor to conspire to do an act
jurious to trade, or commerce.

in-

He said that the legis-

lature had defined conspiracy, and abrogated the conmon
law on the subjedt.

"The conspiracy in this case was

not to commit an offense within the meaning of the
statute ; the raising of wages is no offense ; the conspiracy is the offense, if any has been corrnitted, x x x
The man who ownes an article of trade or commerce is
not obliged to sell it for any particular price, nor is
the mechanic obliged by law to work for any particular
price.

He may say that he will not make coarse boots

for less than $1.00 per pair, but he has no right to say
that no other mechanic shall make them for less.

The

cloth merchant may say that he will not sell his goods
for less than so much per yard but he has no right to
say that any other merchant shall not sell for less
price.

If one individual does not possess such a right

over the conduct of another, no number of individuals
can possess such a right.
to effect such an object,

All combinations,

therefore,

are injurious, not only to the

individual oppressed but also to the public at large.
In the present case an industrious man was driven
out of employment by the unlawful measures pursued by
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the defendants, and an injury done to the community by
diminishing the quantity of productive labor, and of
internal trade."
Master Stevedores' Association v.Walsh :
important New York case is,tion v.Walsh,(2,Daly

5),

The next

Master Stevedore's Associa-

1867.

This was an action

brought by the association against one of its own members
for the recovery of a penalty which the by-laws provided should be forfeited to the society by any member
who should work for less wages than the rates agreed upon
by the society.

The court held that such an association

was not an unlawful combination to commit an act injurious to trade or conerce within the meaning of Rev.
Stat.

1691 (Penal Code Sec.

not unlawful as

168);that such a by-law was

made in restraint of trade ; and that

the society having a right to make such by-law, had a
right to attach to its violation a penalty, which was
collectible in an action at

law.

Judge Daly in his opinion distinguishes this from
former cases, especially, People v Fisher supra., wher e
by-laws were

sought

to be enforced against those who

had not voluntarily submitted to them.
crititizes

the length to which C. J.

He severely

Savage went in

his

4Cj

opinion, denying, and making a strong argument to disprove,that it had ever been a rule of the Common Law that
it was criminal

.

se for workmen to agree together for

the purpose of raising their wages, or that they are
guilty of a criminal conspiracy if by preconcert and
arrangement they refuse to work unless they receive an
advance in wages.

He indorses the language of Judge

Gibson in Cam. v. Carlisle supra, and adopts the broad
proposition laid down in Co_. v.Hunt, supra, that men
are free to work for whom they please, or not to work if
they prefer ; and that it is not criminal for them to
agree together to exercise this right in such a manner
as to subserve their own best interests.
The court

concludes

: "It is otherwise, however,

when associations are formed to intimidate employers or
to coerce other journeymen ; and it matters little what
are the measures adopted, if the object of them is to
interfere with the rights or to coerce the free action of
others.

xx x

It may be laid down as the result

of this examination that it is lawful for any number of
journeymen or of master workmen to agree, on the one
part that they will not work below certain rates, or on
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the other part that

they will not pay above certain

prices ; but that any association or combination for the
purpose of compelling journeymen or employers to conform
to any rule, regulation or agreement,

fixing the rate

of wages, to which they are not parties, by the imposition of penalties, by agreeing to quit the service
of any employer who employes a journeyman below certain
rates, unless the journeyman pays the penalty imposed by
the combination, or by threats, menaces, intimidation,
violence or other unlawful means, is a conspiracy for
which the parties entering into it may be indicted."
Pe
v.Van Nostrand et al :
(see Carson's "Law

of Crinimal Conspiracies")

was a case which arose in

1867 under the same Revised Statute as People v. Fisher.
The defendants were convicted on an indictment
bining,

for com-

and striking in order to compel their employer

to discharge an apprentice in the bricklayer and masons
trade who was not a member of their society.

The

defendants were held to have violated the statute forbidding a combination to do an act

injurious to trade

or commerce.
In a civil action against several members of the
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defendants' society,

the father of the boy forced out of

employment, recovered damages for loss of wages.
People v. Smith :
Sec.

The preceding cases arose under

168 of the Penal Code before the passage in

1870 of

Section 170, authorizing co-operation to raise wages.
In

People ex rel Gill v Smith,

730), which came before the court

(10

N. Y.

St.

Rep.

of Oyer and Terminer

in New York City on writs of habeas corpus and certiorari
it was held criminal under Sec.

168 of the Penal Code

for a committee of the Knights of Labor to demand the
discharge of employes because they would not join the
society,

where the demand was made with a threat

to

strike in case of non-compliance.
The Court held that Sec.

168,

subs.

5 & 6 of the

Penal Code are limited by Sec. 170 only to the extent
of legalizing a peaceable and orderly strike when resorted to in

good faith for the authorized purposes.

Section 170 does not authorize
als

a combination of individu-

to compel by means condemned

in

workingmen to join the co-operative

Section 168,

all

forces or to punish

those who are supposed to be inimical thereto.
Judge Barrett
direct,

or indirect,

said that where there is

no relation,

between wages and strikes,

the

corn-
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bination which brings the latter
purposes

is

about

a criminal conspiracy.

for unlawful

The strike then

involves the "diminishing of productive labor" which is
"an injury to the community and an act

injurious to

trade."
Rogers v. Evarts,(17 N. Y.
1891 in

Sup.

264.),decided in

the Supreme Court of New York,

may be said to lay

down the law pertaining to strikes as it
this state.

The case

exists to-day

in

came before the court on an ap-

plication by Rogers and other cigar manufacturers of
Binghamton for an injunction to
members of the executive
makers,

from advising,

leave the plaintiffs'

restrain the defendants,

committee of the striking cigar-

aiding and encouraging others to
employment.

It was held lawful for the general
strikers to appoint
ets".

certain persons,

to watch the factories,

committee of the

denominated "pick-

ascertain who were work-

ing there and to approach both those who had remained
at work,

ers,

and those who had taken the place of

the

strik-

and to endeavor to persuade them by arguments to

leave their employment

in order to promote their mutual

interests and make the strike effective.

It

was held

lawful also for the "pickets," as an additional

induce-

j

ment,

3

to offer to indemnify those whom they approached

for any losses they should incur in leaving the employment.
It

was held lawful for the strikers to post in

their public meeting place the names of the merchants who
refused to contributeupon solicitation,
who contributed,

as well as those

to the legitimate expenses of the

strikers.
There being no evidence of intimidation in

the

efforts and arguments of the defendants to effect what
was held to be a lawful purpose ; i.e. the raising of
their wages,

the injunction was refused.

Judge Walter Lloyd Smith in his able and lucid
opinion,

repudiates the corrnon law doctrine,

England and same American states,
third party for inducing,

of the liability of a

by persuasion and entreaty a

servant to quit the employment
says :

held in

of his employer.

He

(After citing several authorities upholding the
this

doctrine although never overruled

doctrine)

"But

has never,

to my knowledge,

been explicitly

upheld in

this st ate.
I am not satisfied with the reason of the rule.
x x x

It

is

at least a matter of grave doubt whether

x

54
such right of action will ever be sustained in this

state."
The judge points out that

the combination of the

strikers to advance their wages is protected, by Section
170 of the Penal Code.

But he says, "If the means

employed envolves trespass On any of the plaintiffs'
legal rights, then the co-operation ceases to be orderly
and

the

tive."

section

of

the

He approves the doctrine of Walker v. Cronin,

107 Mass. 564, and Mogu

Q.

Code becomes in-opera-

Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23

B. Div. 598, which justifies a man in using all

reasonable and lawful means in the promotion of his own
business or interests, even though it result in the

in-

jury or ruin of his rival, and exempts him from all liability for any damages which another may suffer as a
result

of such lawful competition.

Judge Barrett

The language of

in People v.Kostka below, is also quoted

and approved.
The court

continues

:

"The tendency of modern

thought and of judicial decision is to the enlargement
of the right of combination, whether of capital or of
labor.

All re striction has not been removed ; but I

am not willing to hold that the combination which appears
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in this case,
is

in

itself and apart from the methods used,

within the condemnation of the law as it

ted by our courts.

is

interpre-

Irrespective of any statute, I think

the law now permits workmen,

at least,

within a limited

territory, to combine together and to seek any
advantage in their trade.

legitimate

The increase of wages is

such an advantage.
The right to combine,involves of necessity,the
right to persuade all co-laborers to join in the combiThis is

nation.
bination.

but a

corollary of the right of com-

x x x x x

There may be cases, however, where persuasion and
entreaty are not lawful instruments to effect the purposes of a strike.

Even persuasion and entreaty may be

used in such a manner, with such persistency, and with
such environments as to constitute intimidation.
use then becomes a violation of law.

Their

x x x x

Whenever the strikers assume toward the employes
an attitude of menace,then persuasion and entreaty with
words,

however smooth,

may constitute

intimidation which

will render those who use them liable to both the civil
and criminal law. "
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Section 3.

Strikes and Boycottsunder

the

Laws of the United States.
It

is

only within the last few years

that the United

States Courtw have been called upon to interpret and apply the law to conspiracies

involving strikes and boy-

Under the laws of the United States no con-

cotts.

spiracies are criminal unless expressly declared so by
The federal

statute.

courts differ from the English

courts and the courts of most of the states in that they
consider no conspiracy criminal,

however unlawful

its

purpose,until some overt act has been done to carry out
the purpose of the conspiracy.
The cases

involving labor troubles,

strikes

and boy-

cottshave been brought into the United States courts on
two grounds

:

(1) contempt of court in interfering with

a receiver operating a railroad under orders of the court,
and (2) violations of the United States statutes forbidding any interference
mails,

with the transportation of the

and any contract,

combination or conspiracy

in

restraint of trade and commerce between the states or
with foreign nations.

The federal courts have been

progressive

in

fearless

the application of the law as thus interpret-

in

their interpretation

of the statutes

and
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They have left

ed.

room for doubt that they will

little

use their whole power when appealed to for the enforcement of the law and the protection of life and property.
Their firm and decisive attitude has done much to bring
labor organizations

to their caln

and strike leaders

senses and a knowledge

of the rights of others,

must be potent in preventing hasty or

and it

reckless outbreaks

of labor in the future.
United States Statutes.

The laws of the United

States pertaining to the carriage of the mails which are
material to the present discussion,

are as follows

:

Section 3995 of the Revised Statutes originally enacted
March 3,

1825,

:

reads

"Any person who shall knowingly and wilully obstruct and retard the passage of the mail,
riage,

horse,

or any car-

driver or carrier carrying the same,

for every such offense,

shall,

be punishable by a fine of not

more than one hundred dollars."
Section 3964 Rev.

Stat.

declares

that "All railroads

or parts of railroads which are now or hereafter may be
in
off

operation" are established post roads.
March 3,

shall,

in

all

1879,
cases,

provides

Section 3,

Act

that the Postmaster General

decide on what trains and in what
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manner the mails shall be carried.
Section 4000 of the Revised Statutes provides that
"Every railway company carrying the mails shall carry
on any train which may run over its road, and without
extra charge therefor, all mailable matter directed to be
carried thereon, and the person in charge of the same".
The other United States Statutes involved in the
discussion of strikes and boycotts
2,

1890,

entitled,

The sections

"Section 1.

the act

of July

"An Act to protect trade and commerce

against unlawful restraints
209, c. 647).

is

and monopolies,"
in

(26 St. p.

question are as follows

Every contract,

combination in the

form of trust or Otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations,
Section 2.

is hereby declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall monopolize,

or

attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons to monopolize, any part of the
trade or commerce among the several states or with for-

eign nat ions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by both said punishments,

in the
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discretion of the court."

The interpretation of these laws by the courts

and

their application to strikes and boycotts can be best
presented by a review of the leading cases arising under them.

Section 4.

Cases under United States Statutes.

The first case of importance

is the United States

v. Patterson, et al, 55 Fed. 605, which came before the
Circuit Court for the district of Massachusetts, on Feb.
28, 1893.

It arose on a demurrer to an indictment,

against Patterson and others, under the act of July 2,
1890.

Judge Putnam decided that the words "trade" and

"commerce" as used in the act are synonomous, and he interprets the statute as applying duly to combinations
and conspiracies which aim to restrain trade between the
states by engrossing, monopolizing or grasping the market.

He expressly guards against the broader interpre-

tation given to the statute later in U. S. v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans,
994)
sidy,

;

U. S. v. Debs

(67 Fed. 698.)

(64 Fed. 763)

; and

(94 Fed.Rep.
U. S. v. Cas-

His language is as follows

"Careless or inapt construction of

the statute as bear-
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ing on this case, while it may seem to create but a
small divergence here, will, if followed out logically,
extend into very large fields

;

because if the propo-

sition made by the United States is taken with its full
force, the inevitable result will be that the federal
courts will be compelled to apply this statute to all
attempts to restrain commerce among the states, or commerce with foreign nations, by strikes or boycotts, or
by every method of interference by way of violence or
intimidation.

It is not to be presumed that congress

intended thus to extend the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States without very clear language.

Such

language I do not find in the statute."
Unit'ed States v. Workingm nA!, Amalgamated Council
of New Orleans;
Within a month after the decision of Judge Putnam
in U. S. v. Patterson sup

a directly contrary in-

terpretation was given to the act of July 2, 1890, by
Judge Billings, sitting in the circuit court for the
Eastern District of Louis iana,,in United States v.
Workingmens' Amagaated Council of New Orleans, 54 Fed.
994.

The cause was submitted on an application for an

injunction to restrain the combined labor unions of New

61
Orleans from obstructing and restraining interstate comThe facts in

merce.

:

the case in brief were

A dif-

ference had sprung up between the warehousemen and their
employes

and the principal draymen and their subordinates,

as to wages, hours and men to be employed.
compel compliance

In order to

on the part of the employers with the

demands of the employed,

all

the union men,

under the di-

rection of the recognized officers of their various
associations,

decided to discontinue business.

labor

One

part of their business was the transporting of goods
which were being conveyed from state to state,
from foreign countries.
an

and to and

In some branches of business

effort was made to replace the union men by other

workmen.

This was resisted by vast throngs of Union men

assembling in
lence,

the streets,

and in

some instances by vio-

so that as the result of the intended acts of the

strikers, not a bale of the goods constituting the commerce of the country could be moved.
obliged to call

The mayor was

upon the citizens to assist

suppressing disorder

the police

; and finally the governon

out the militia to protect life

called

and property from the

lawlessness of the strikers.
In

reply to the contention of the defendants

that

in

32

the case did not fall

within the purview of the statute,

which prohibited monopolies and combinations of capitalists, and not of laborers,

said

"I think that the con-

gressional debates show that the statute had its origin
in

the evils of massed capital

; but,

came to formulating the prohibition
subject had so broadened in

when the congress
x x x x x x x

the

the minds of the legislators,

that the source of the evil was not regarded as material,
and the evil in

its entirety is

dealt with.

They made

the interdiction include combinations

of labor as well as

of capital

inrestraint

; in

fact all combinations

of

commerce without regard to the character of the persons
who entered into them."

After examiningother

claims of

the defendants and reviewing the facts as stated above,
"The question simply is,

the court continued;

facts establish a case within the statute ?
me this question is

tantamount

It

to the question,

there be a case within the statute ?

do these
seems to
could

It is conceded

that the labor organizations were at the outset lawful.
But,

when lawful forces are put into unlawful channels,-

i.e.

when lawful associations adopt and further unlawful

purposes and do unlawful acts,
selves become unlawful.
fulness,

-

the associations

The evil,

them-

as well as the unlaw-

of the act of the defendants,

consists in

this
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that until certain demands of theirs were complied with,
they endeavored to prevent, ,and did prevent everybody
from moving the commerce of the country."
The court adopts the definition of C. J. Savage in
People v. Fisher, supra as to the meaning of "restraint
of trade",

and concludes :

"It is the successful effort

of the combination of the defendants to intimidate and
overawe others who were at work in conducting or carrying
on the commerce of the country, in which the court finds
their error and their violation of the statute.

One

of the intended results of their combined action was the
forced stagnation of all the commerce which flowed through
New Orleans.

x x x x x

For these reasons I think the

injunction should issue."
The Pulman Strike.

The great railroad strike of

1894, with its wide-spreading effects, brought home to
the public the great and pressing importance of the labor
question and it gave rise to some striking examples of

the use of injunction by the Federal courts, as a remedy
against the strike and boycott.

It grew out of a disa-

greement between the Pulman Palace Car Company of Pulman,
Ill.,
wages.

and their large force of employes as to the rate of
On May 11, 1894,

the employes

of the Pulman
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Company left the company's

employ because of its refusal

to restore wages which had been reduced during the preceding year,
1894,

and the works were then closed.

the American Railway Union,

In

June,

an organization

com-

posed of railroad employes below a certain rank, boasting a membership of 250,000,
throughout

the West,

was in

and strongly established
convention at Chicago.

convention took the grievances
der consideration,

of the Pulman employes un-

and out of sympathy for what they held

to be the wrongs of the workmen,
to declare a boycott of
centering

in

The

Chicago,

they voted on June 21st

the Pulman cars on all roads

and wherever the union was organiz-

ed, unless the differences at Pulman were settled within
five days.

The officers of the Railway Union were author-

ized to announce the boycott and to order and direct a
strike if

necessary to enforce

it.

The Pulman Company

having ignored the demands of the Railray Union,
26,

President Eugene V.

Debs

issued orders

on June

to the members

of the union to refuse to handle Pulman cars on all the
roads.

Most of these roads were bound by contract to

haul the cars of the Pulmnan Company,
ed upon their employes handling them.

and therefore

ins ist-

When many workmen

were being discharged for their refusal to do their duty,
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the A. R. U.,

through its officers, ordered all its mem-

bers on the hostile roads to go out on strike until the
Pulman trouble should be settled and the discharged men
re ins tat ed.
Nearly all the roads

entering Chicago and extending

to the Pacific coast were thus tied up.
left wherever the train was abandoned,
delayed,

Passengers were
the mails were

transportation was obstructed,

and trade and

commerce over a vast extent of territory were paralyzed
for many days.
The strikers congregated
yards and resorted ti

insults,

in

mobs at the railroad

and violence,

to force

others to leave their employment and to prevent new men
from entering the employment which they had abandoned.
Trains were side-tracked,

engines

were completely blockaded

; cattle were left to die

the yards,
tracks,

"killed",; the tracks
in

and hundreds of cars were overturned on the

and with their

contents,

given to the flames.

The police force was unable to suppress disorder and
protect property.

The federal courts were appealed to

by the Railroad Companies,

and on July 2, they issued an

injunction order under the act of July 2,
President

Debs,

Vice-President

Howard,

1890,

Secretary

enjoining
Keliher,
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Director Rogers and all others
United States mails,

or restraining

The strike leaders
and act

; and it

been called in

from interfering with the
interstate commerce.

ignored the injunction by word

was only after the Federal troops had
and several lives had been sacrificed,

law and order were restored.

Debs,

Howard,

that

Keliher and

others were arrested on warrant of attachment for contempt, and on Dec. 14,
Woods,

in

1894 were brought before Judge

the Circuit Court for the Northern District of

Illinois.
United States v. Debs,

et al,

(64 Fed.

724).

The

court, while arguing Strongly and at length that the
conspiracy charged against the defendants

to hinder and

interrupt interstate commerce and the carriage of the
mails upon the railroads centering in
means and in

the manner indicated,

Chicago,

by the

was such a public nui-

sance as to warrant the Federal courts in restraining
it by the remedy of injunction, still expressly refrained
from establishing a precedent by resting its

decision on

that ground.
Instead,
upon which it

the injunction was sustained on the grounds
was granted under the act of July 2,

1890.
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against the vigorous contentions of the

The court held,

defendants, that that act, declaring it illegal and a
misdemeanor to enter into any contract,
form of trust,

or otherwise,

combination in the
in

or conspiracy,

restraint

of trade and comnerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations,

was intended to apply to combinations

and conspiracies

of workingmen as well. as contracts

combinations of capital ;

and

and that the act expressly

authorized the equitable remedy of injunction by United
States courts for its

enforcements.

The defendants were adjudged guilty of contempt in
persisting in

their conduct and disobeying the injunction

wnd were accordingly sentenced to one year's

imprisonment.

Thus, through the elastic powers of a court of equity, the
ambitious and arrogant President Debs and his colleagues,
who assumed to dictate to the employers of labor, who
connived at disorder which they pretended to discourage,
and who threatened to bring capital to its
paralize the commerce of the country,

were brought to pay

the penalty of their ambition arid rashness
cell.

knees and to

in

a prison
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The case of United States v Debs supra

In re Debs.

was carried before the United States Supreme Court on a
petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus.
U. S.

564.

Decided May 27, 1895.)

(In re Debs 158
The writ was refused

on the ground that "the circuit court having

full

jurisdiction in

to the act

the premises,

its findings as

of disobedience are not open to review on habeas corpUs
in this or any other court."

In

an elaborate

and able

opinion by Justice Brewer, the Supreme Court sustained
the authority and action of the circuit

court in granting

an injunction against the obstruction of the mails and
interstate commerce

and in

punishing for contempt,

those

who disobeyed the order.
In

summing up his conclusions

the court said :

"We

hold that the government of the United States is one having jurisdiction of every part of soil within its territory, and acting. directly on each citizen ;
it

is

a government of enumerated powers,

the limits of those powers all
cignty,

that to it

is

that while

it

has within

the attributes of sover-

committed power over interstate

commerce and the transmission of the mails

;

that the

powers thus conferred upon the national government are
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not dormant,

but have been assumed and put

exercise by the legislation of Congress
exercise of those powers

it

is

into practical

;

that in the

competent for the govern-

ment to remove all obstruction on highways, natural or
artificial,

to the passage of interstate commerce or the

carrying of the mails
for the government

;

that while

it

may he competent

(through the executive branch and in

the use of the entire executive power of the nation)
forcibly remove all such obstructions,
within its

it

is

to

equally

competency to appeal to the civil courts for

an inquiry and determination as to the existence and character of any alleged obstructions,

and if

such are found

to exist, or threaten to occur, to invoke the powers of
those courts to remove or restrain such obstructions

;

that the jurisdiction of the courts to interfere in such
matters by injunction is one recognized from ancient
times and by indubitable authority
that under the complaint made,
power to issue
been

;

.

.

.

.

its process of injunction,

Court had power to inquire whether its
and when it

.

the circuit court
that it

issued and served on these defendants,

disobeyed,

.

.

.

.

.

had
having

the Circuit

orders had been

found that they had been,

then to
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proceed under section 725,

Rev.

to punish by fine or imprisonment,
by any party .
order,

rule,

.

.

which grants power

St.,
.

.

disobedience

.

or other person to any lawful writ,

decree or command,

punishment complained of."

.

and enter the order of

.

The court expressly refrained from examining the act
of July 2,

upon which the Circuit

1890,

mainly to sustain its

injunction,

Court relied

explaining that while

they did not dissent from the conclusions of the lower
court as to the scope of that act,

they preferred to rest

their judgment on the broader grounds discussed in the
opinion.
Thomas v. Railway Co.,

Thomas v. Railway Co.
re Phelan (62 Fed.

803)

in

was another important case growIt

ing out of the Pulman boycott and strike of 1894.

came before the Circuit Court for the southern district
of Ohio on July 13, 1894,
case of United States v.
suit of Thomas v.

Debs supra,

Cincinnati,

Pacific Railway Company,
ed receiver.

some months earlier than the
at Chicago.

In the

New Orleans and Texas

Samuel M. Felton was appoint-

This case now arose on a petition filed

by this receiver for the commitment

of F.

W. Phelan

for contempt and for an injunction against him,

for inter-
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fering with the operation of the

receiver's road.

The testimony showed that Phelan the contemnor
to Cincinnati on June 24th,
Debs of the A.R.
Pulman boycott

U.,

came

under orders of President

to take charge of the contemplated

on the roads entering that city.

He

made numerous speeches before meetings of the employes
of the railroads,

including those of the receiver,

vising and inciting
vent all
if

them to go out on strike, 'and to pre-

others from taking their places,

possible,

ad-

by clubbing if

necessary.

by persuasion,
He organized

a city committee of working men to assist him in conducting the strike.
Cincinnati were

Most of the railroads entering

tied up,

traffic was practically

mails were delayed,
stopped,

freight

interstate commerce

inter.

rupted and restrained, and the receiver of the Cincinnati
Southern,

the petitioner,

was put to great trouble and

expense to secure and maintain armed protection for his
The learned Judge Taft,

employes.
ion,

granted

attempt,

the petition

in an elaborate

on the ground

that any wilful

with knowledge that a railroad is

of a court,

to prevent

the receiver

between private

which is

unlawful,

in

the hands

thereof appointed by

the court from complying with the order
running the road,

opin-

of the court

and which,

in

as

individuals would give a right of action
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a contempt of the order of the court.

for damages, is

that it

The judge pointed out
ployes of the receiver,

as well as any other employes to

organize and act together,
own interest
if

was lawful for the em-

for the promotion of their

; to quit the employment

they wished,

of the receiver

or for Phelan to advise and induce them

to quit the employment,

so long as their acts were peaceBut he held

able and in pursuance of a lawful purpose.

that maliciously inciting the employes of all the Cinnot on account

cinnati roads to leave their employment,
of any grievance of their own,

but in

the furtherance

of an unlawful conspiracy, was an unlawful wrong, for
which Phelan was liable to the employers for damages,
for which,
ceiver,

as far as his acts affected

he was in

the road of the re-

contempt of court.

The combination of Debs,
the A.R.U.

and

Phelan and the directors of
(1)

was held to be unlawful on the grounds,

that it sought to compel the railroad companies to break
their contracts with Pulman,
to inflict

(2)

that it

pecuniary injury on Pulman,

was a boycott

and on the roads

that refused to break their contracts with him,
it

interfered with the mails,

interstate commerce.

and (4)

that it

(3)

that

paralyzed
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Phelan was sentenced to six months

in

for his

jail

contempt.

United States v. Cassidy (67 Fed. 698.) was another
great case which grew out
It

was a trial

in

for the northern district
against Cassidy,

of the big Pulman strike.

the United States Circuit Court
of California

Mayne and others,

5440 and the act of July 2,

on an indictment

under Rev.

St.

Section

1890 for conspiracy to corrmit

offenses against the United States, namely the offense of
obstructing

and the

the mails of the United States,

offense of combining and conspiring to restrain trade and
commerce between the states and with foreign countries.
The charge delivered by Judge Morrow

in

this case

believed to be the longest ever delivered in
case in

this country,

and only exceeded in

The trial

to April 6,

1895.

occupied five months,

a criminal

any case by

the charge of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in
Case.

is

the Tichborne

from Nov.

12,

While only two of the defendants were

tried, the case was treated as a test case both by the
government

1894

and by the strikers,

and it

involved as a

practical result the disposition of some 4.32 cases.
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The judge said that although the statute against
obstructing the mails was passed before the establishment
of railroads and its phraseology conformed to the conditions of that time, yet it protects alike the transportation of the mail by the "limited express", as it does
the carriage by the old fashioned stage coach.
He continues

:

"Recurring to section 3995 of the

Revised Statutes, and you will observe that the statute
applies to those persons who knowingly and willfully
obstruct and retard the passage of the
carrier carrying the same ;

mails, or the

that is to say to those who

know that the acts performed, however innocent they may
otherwise be, will have the effect of obstructing and
retarding the passage of the mail, and they perform the
acts with the intention that such shall be the operation."
(Citing United States vrKirby, 7 Wall,485).

He approves

the language of Thomas v.Railway Co. (62 Fed. 822),that it
would be no defense under this statute that the obstruction was effected by merely quitting employment, where the
motive for quitting was to retard the mails and had
nothing to do with the terms of employment.
"The statute also applies to persons who, having in
view the accomplishment of other purposes, perform unlaw-
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ful acts which have the effect

of obstructing and retard-

ing the passage of the mails.

In such case, an intent

to obstruct and retard the mails will be imputed to the
authors of the unlawful act, although the attainment
other ends may have been their primary object."
United States v Kirby,
In

dictment under the act of July 2,

jected

1890,

against

restraint of trade and commerce,
the language

Patterson, (55 Fed.
"commerce"

(Citing

7 Wall 485)

regard to the second offense charged in

acies in

of

the inconspir-

the court re-

of Judge Putnam in United States v.

605),

that the term "trade" and

as used in the statute are synonymous,

that the word "commerce"

as used in

constitution, of the United States,
than the word "trade".

charged

that act and in

the

has a broader meaning

and that co4smerce among the states

consists of intercourse anf traffic between their citizens
and includes

the transportation of persons and property

as well as the purchase,

sale

and exchange

"Pulman cars,in use upon the roads,'
of commerce,
was doubtless

are

of commodities.

instrumentalities

and while the primary object of the statute
to prevent the destruction of legitimate and

healthy competition in

interstate commnerce,

by engrossing
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yet

and monopolizing the markets for the commodities,

are broad enough to reach a combination

its provisions,

or conspiracy that will interrupt the transportation of
such commodities

and persons from one state to another,

While acknowledging the rights of employes
companies

to organize for mutual benefit and protection

and for the purpose
best

of railway

conditions

of securing the highest wages and the

they can command,

the court declared it

unlawful for them to ccnbine and quit work for the purpose
of compelling their employer to withdr'amw from his relations with a third party,
that

third party,

for the purpose of injuring

(following Thomas v.Railway Co,

62 Fed.

817.)
After reviewing the voluminous
conduct

of the strikers,

testimony as to the

and examining the leading

federal court decisions in analogous cases, the court
announces

as law,

the proposition that a strike,

preconcerted quitting of work,
way employes,

action is
to it

is

in

itself

or a

by a combination of rail-

unlawful,

if

the concerted

knowingly and willingly directed by the parties

for the purpose of obstructing and retarding the

passage of the mails,

or

in

restraint of trade or
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commerce among the states.
NOTE.

The

jury,after deliberating four days and

nights failed to agree and were discharged.
ballot,

10 jurymen voted for conviction and two for

acquittal,
mails,

On the final

upon the count for conspiracy to retard the

and eight for conviction and four for acquittal,

on the count for conspiracy to obstruct and interfere
with interstate

commerce.
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Chapter III.
B 0 Y C 0 T T S.

Section I.

Definition.

Black's Law Dictionary defines the boycott to be
"A conspiracy

formed and intended directly or indirectly

to prevent the cayrying on of any lawful business, or to
injure the business of anyone by wrongfully preventing
those who would be customers from buying anything from,
or employing the representatives of said business, by
threats, intimidation or other forcible means."
Anderson's Law Dictionary says it is "A combination
between persons to suspend or discontinue dealings or
patronage with another person or persons because of a
refusal to comply with a request of him or them.

The

purpose is to constrain acquiesence or to force submission on the part of the individual, who, by non-compliance with the demand, has rendered himself obnoxious
to the

immediate parties, and, perhaps to their per-

sonal and fraternal associates."
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0ri gin of the t erm .

The real meaning of the

term may be gathered somewhat from the circumstances of
its origin.
These circumstances are narrated by Mr. Justin H.
McCarthy, the Irish parliamentarian and writer, in his
book entitled, "England under Gladstone"

as follows :

"The strike was supported by a form of action, or
rather inaction, which soon became historical.

Captain

Boycott was an Englishman, an agent of Lord Earne, and
a farmer of Lough Mask, in the wild and beautiful
district of Connemara.

In his capacity as agent he had

served notices upon Lord Earne's tenants, and the tenants
suddenly retaliated in the most unexpected way by, in the
language of schools and society, sending Captain Boycott
to Coventry in a very thorough manner.

The population

of the region for miles around resolved not to I-ve anything to do with him, and, as far as they could prevent
it, not to allow any one else to have anything to do
with himn.

His life appeared to be in danger

to claim police protection.

; he had

His servants fled from him

as servants flee from their masters in some plague
stricken Italian city.

The awPIul sentence of excom-

munication could hardly have rendered him more helplessly

80
alone for a time ; no one would work for him ; no one
would supply him with food.

He and his wife had to

work in their own fields themselves, in most unpleasant
imitation of the Theocritian shepherds and shepherdesses,
and play out their grim eclogue in their deserted fields,
with the shadows of armed constabulary ever at their
heels.

The Orangemen of the north heard of Captain

Boycott and his sufferings, and the way in which he was
holding his ground, and they organized assistance and
sent him down armed laborers from Ulster.

To prevent

civil war, the authorities had to send a force of
soldiers and police toLough Mask, and Captain Boycott's
harvests were brought

in, and his potatoes dug, by the

armed Ulster laborers, guarded always by the little
army. "
In Casey v. Cincinnati Tpographical Union below, it
is said that the boycott is itself a threat.

The court

in the Connecticut case of State v. Glidden (55 Conn. 46)
said that the term in its original meaning "signifies

violence if not murder."

In the notable Virginia case

(Cruxnp v.The Cormonwealth,84 Va. 927. ) the court said :
"The essential idea of boycotting, whether in Ireland or
the United States, is a confederation whose intent is
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to injure another by preventing any and all
doing business with him,
displeasure,

persons from

through fear of incurring the

persecution and vengeance

of the

conspira-

tors."
The incidents described by Mr. Mc Carthy occurred in
the year 1882.

While the name is

of recent

offense is

as

punishable

conspiracy at Common Law,

old as English law reports,

origin the

and it

was a

Nor has the

con-

spiracy for that purpose been confined to workingmen.
The acts of the brewers in

the case of Kin

ling (Tubwomen v. Brewers of London)
a boycott.

v.

Star_..

supra. constituted

The purpose of their conspiracy was to

ruin the farmers of the

excise by pauperizing them,

ren-

dering them unable to pay the king's revenue and turning
the hostility of the poor people

of London into mob

violence against them.
In Mogul Steamship C6.,
476

;

23 Q. B. Div.

a Steamship Co.,

598)

v.

McGregor (15 Q. B. Div.

the conspiracy of the

defendants,

was to drive the plaintiff out of the

carrying trade by means of the boycott.
They sent circulars to the patrons of the plaintiff
engaged in
if

the tea trade in

they continued to ship b

China,

not ifying them that

the plaintiff's

line,

the
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defendants would deny them the benefits of any future
The effect was to ruin the business

dealings with them.
of the plaintiff,,

but the defendants were excused on

the ground that their acts were in

the legitimate pursuit

and furtherance of their own business,

and not malicious

or designed primarily to injure the plaintiff.
Plaintiffs'

injury and loss was held to be the result of

legitimate competition.

However Lord Coleridge wrote

a strong dissenting opinion.
Other competing business

enterprises have resorted

to the boycott.
The boycott then,

was not primarily nor essentially

a feature of labor troubles,

nor confined in

its

use to

Most strikes embraee some of the character-

workingmen.

istics of the boycott, for when men have gone out on
strike,

it

is

to their interest to prevent the employers'

conducting his business without them.

However it has

often of late years been the con-comitant
all important

strikes, and it is

of nearly

in that relation, and

often on account of the threats and intimidation by
which it

was sought to be enforced that

it

has come most

frequently under the cognizance of the cou~ts.
A review of the leading American cases involving it

00

will best explain its

Section 2

legal status in

Cases on Boycotts.

v Wil~ig :

Pe

Crim.

(4 N. Y.

this country.

The case of People v. Wilzig,
Tried at Oyer and Tert-

403),

Reports,

miner in New York City in June 1886, was a trial of the
defendants on an indictment for extortion by a wrongful
use of force or fear, under Sections 552, 553, Penal
The extortion

Code.

charged was to pay the expenses of

a boycott against the prosecutor, and was extorted by a
threat

to Continue the boycott perpetually in

case of

non-compliance with the demands of the defendants.
The facts in brief were as follows
The

complainant,

Geo.

Theiss,

manager of a large building in
New York City,

was the owner and

East Fourteenth Street,

used as a concert hall and restaurant.

He had an orchestra of thirteen pieces,
large number of waiters,
attaches.

--

and employed a

bartenders and other various

His son was his head bartender,

and the

leader of his orchestra was a man whom he had known for
ten years and who had been associated with him in
business.
$300,000,

The accumulations of a lifetime,
were invested in

almost

this establishinent.
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The defendants,

Paul Wilzig of Waiters'

Union,

No. 3 ; Max Dannhauser and Hans Holdorf, of the Carl
Union,

Sahm Club ; Strop and Rosenburg of Bartenders'

No. 1 ; O'Leary of the Knights of Labor and Beddles, of
the Central Labor Union, came to Mr. Theiss' place and
informed him that he should discharge his waiters,
chestra,

or-

and bartenders and employ only help belonging

to their respective
by these unions.

clubs and unions,
Mr.

and at wages fixed

Theiss replied that he did not

feel like discharging his son,

other faithful and satisfactory servants
did not belong to the unions,

and.

his brother-in-law,

; but since they

the defendants

insisted

that he should discharge them.
Finally,

they informed Theiss that if

he did not

comply with their demands within twenty-four hours,
boycott would be placed upon his business.
of the twenty-four hours,

Mr.

a

At the end

Theiss not having complied

with the demands of the defendants,

the b.oycott was or-

dered on.
He found a body of men walking up and down before
his place of business,

wearing old hats pasted over with

libelous circulars headed "boycott,"

announcing

public that Theiss was a foe of organized labor,

to the

35
calling on all people to abstain from visiting his place,
and charging him with being an obscure man.

The circu-

lar was signed by the boycott commnittee of the Central
The circulars were borne on the backs of

Labor Union.
the procession.

A large crowd assembled to witness this

strange proceeding, and made it difficult and dangerous
for people to visit this place of ammusement.

Men under

the direction of the defendants went inside and posted
the libelous circulars on the tables,
and on the frescoed walls.

in the closets,

An attempt was made to paste

a circular on the back of Theiss'

son while crossing the

street.

The iron and glass roof of the building was

raised.

They brought in

fire to it,

an infernal machine and set

creating such a stinch that

business had to

be suspended for four hours.
Thus the boycott was continued every afternoon and
evening for fifteen days,

the fifty

engaged in it being refreshed

or more men who were

or relieved, as need be,

under the directions of the defendants.
to Mr.
waters,

Shultz,

Then they went

of whom Theiss purchased his mineral

and demanded of him that he should sell

Theiss

no more goods under penalty of himself being boycotted.
He yielded and refused to supply Mr.

Theiss with mineral
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water.
The defendants then demanded of Mr. Ehret,
Mr. Theiss bought his beer,
he should furnish Mr.
formed him that if
Mr.

of whom

the staple of' his tradethat

Theiss no more beer,

They in-

he did continue to supply beer to

Theiss they would boycott his beer by the Knights

of Labor throughout the United States.
threat, Mr.

Moved by this

Ehret brought Mr. Theiss, and a representa-

tive of each class of his employes to his brewery where
they met the defendants and heard their demand.

Mr.

Theiss labored long to protect his seventy-five faithful
employes.
beer,

But Mr.

Ehret,

labored with Mr.

eight hours

,

fearing the boycott of his

Theiss, and after holding out

he yielded to the demands of the

defendants, and agreed to discharge his old help and
employ only members of the organizations which the boycott
leaders represented,

and at their scale of wages.

defendants then demanded that Mr.
them $1000,OO

Theiss should pay

as the expenses of the boycott.

he protested against this exaction,
that

if

The

When

they threatened him

he did not pay at once the Knights of Labor would

order a perpetual boycott
business anywhere in

so that he could not

the civilized world.

carry on

Under these
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a check

threats he yielded and paid the $1000.00 in
which the defendants

had cashed and divided the proceeds

among themselves.
Justice Barrett, in his charge to the jury, said :
"Let us see what workingmen trying to better their
condition

may

lawfully do,

The law is

fully do.

and what they may not law-

tender of their rights.

x x x

Now it has been legislatively decreed that
the orderly and peacable assembling or co-operation of
persons employed in

any calling,

trade or handicraft,

for the purpose of obtaining an advance in the rate of
wages and compensation,

or of maintaining such rate,

(Penal Code 170).

not a conspiracy.

laboring men may lawfully do.

is

This is what

What they may not do is

to combine together to prevent other people from working
at prices to suit themselves."
After conceding the right of laboring men to go around peaceably among their friends and persuade them to
withdraw their

patronage

from the man who

or refuses to do them justice,

he says

:

injures them

"It

is

one

thing for a man or men to go about and talk to their
friends,

but it

is

quite another thing for fifty

or sixty

or one hundred men to band together not for the purpose
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of indivudual persuasion,

an unlawful way to injure the em-

bination to bear in
ployerts buisness.

x x x x x

threats or intimidation.
this word intimidation.
have the idea that if
in

Now, the law says that

the persons so engaged use force,

that may not be done if

operating

but to bring the power of com-

Let us see what
The defendants'

a body of men,

is

meant

by

counsel seem to

however large,

the manner suggested only avoids acts of

physical violence,

they are within the law,

and that

the

employers business may be ruined with impunity so long as
no blow is
uttered.

struck,

nor actual threat by word of mouth

This is an error.

The men who walk up and

down in front. of a man's shop may be guilty of intimidation,

though they never raise

a finger or utter a

Their attitude nevertheless may be that of

word.
menace.
methods,

They may intimidate by their numbers,
their placards,

their

their circulars and their de-

vices."
The jury brought

in

verdicts of guilty,

fendants were sentenced to hard labor in

and the de-

States Prison

for periods varying from a year and six months to three
years and eight monthe.
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Peo
in

vKostka(4 N. Y.

the same court and before

Wil

supra.

It

Crin.

Rep.),

429,

was tried

the same judge as People v.

came before the court

in

July 1886,

only one week later than the Wilzig case.
It

differed from the latter

case in

trial

of the defendants on an indictment

Subd.

5 of the Penal Code,

that

it

was a

under Sec,

for interfering

168,

with the

peaceable pursuit of the prosseutors business by boycotting,

picketing,

etc.,

while the main issue in

the Wilzig

case was that of extortion to which the boycott had been
preliminary and auxiliary.

The facts of the case in

brief are as follows :-The prosecutor, one Josephine Landgraff, carried on
a small way in the City of New

the baker business in
York.

The defendants,

who were in her employ,

becoming

dissatisfied with the rate of wages, or because some
proscribed person was employed,
which the witnesses,
or willing to make

or for some other cause,

being foreigners,
clear,

left

did not seem able

the employment,

an% at-

tempted to injure the employer's business by assembling,
sometimes to the number of fifteen before her shop and
distributing printed circulars declaring a boycott,

set-

ting forth the grievances of the boycotters and calling
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on the widow's customers to withhold their trade.

There

was also evidence that one of the defendants threatened
the life of one of Mrs. Landgraff's faithful employes,
and that some of them spat in the faces of some of her
bakers, and indulged in other acts of violence.
Judge Barrett in his charge to the jury after laying
down the law as in the case of People v.Wil

supra, as

to the extent to which workmen could legally go in the
promotion of their interests, said in regard to intimidation :-"The mere fact that no violence was actually used in
the street is not conclusive.

It is for you to say

whether the attitude of these men was threatening.

Nor

is it necessary that there should have been a direct
threat.

If you believe that the attitude actually pre-

sented by the distributors of those circulars was an
attitude of intimidation, either to the passers-by, or
to the woman inside (Mrs. Landgraff),

considering all

the circumstances, then all who participated in it directly or indirectly, are within the meaning of that
word as used in the conspiracy act.
X

X

x

X

x

x

X

X

x

X
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If the conspiracy here be established and the effect
of the overt acts was to intimidate and by such intimidation to warn of f Mrs. Landgraff's customers and the
general public which might otherwise patronize her, and
to intimidate her, then such of the defendants as so
conspired and participated in the overt acts are guilty."
Most of the defendants were indicted ard sentenced
for periods

varying from ten to thirty days.

Crump v.The Commonwealth, (84 Va. 927) is a leading
case on "boycott" which was brought before the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia in 1888.
It came up on error in an indictment against Crump
for conspiring with others to boycott the business of
Baughman Bros.
The evidence of the case shows that while Baughman
Bros. were engaged in their business as stationers and
printers,

the plaintiff in error and other members of

the Richmond Typographical Union, No. 90, a branch of

the Knights of Labor, conspired to compel Baughman Bros.
to make their office a "Union Office" and to employ only
printers belonging to the said union.

Upon the re-

fusal of Baughman Bros. to comply with this demand the

Union decided to boycott the firm,

as they had threatened
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and they sent

to do,

circulars to a great many of the
they had,

customers of the firm informing them that

"with the aid of the Knights of Labor and all the trades
organizations

in

this city

tablishment of Messrs.

(Richmond)

Baughman Bros:

boycotted the es; and formally

notifying the said customers that the names of all persons who should persist

in trading,

ing with Baughman Bros.

,

patronizing,

after being duly notifyed of
the Labor

would be published weekly in

the boycott,

Herald as a "black list,"

or deal-

and that they,

in

turn would

be boycotted until they agreed to withdraw their patronage from Baughman Bros.

The threat was carried out.

For months Baughman Bros.,their employes and customers
were mercilessly hounded by publication after publication in

the Labor Herald,

whereby it
them,

(the organ of the boycotters),

was attempted to excite public feeling against

and to prevent the

employes of the "rat" firm from

obtaining even board and shelter.
mers and patrons of the firm,

The names of custo-

includ1ig boarding houses,,

public schools and railroads and steamboat

companies,

were published under the standing head of

"black list."

Space will

ixt permit quotations from these "incendiary"

publi cat ions.
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After reviewing these facts the court concluded its
opinion by saying :

"It was proved that the conspirators

declared their set purpose and persistant effort to
"crush" Baughman Bros.--thereby causing them to lose
from one hundred and fifty to two hundred customers and
$10,000 net profits.

The acts alleged and proved in

this case are unlawful and incompatible with the prosperity, peace and civilization of the country ; and if they
can be perpetrated with impunity, by combinations of
irresponsible cabals or cliques, there will be an end
of government, and of society itself.

Freedom--indi-

vidual and associated,-- is the boasted policy and
peculium of our country

: but it is liberty regulated by

law ; and the motto of the law is ; Sic utere tuo, ut
alienum non leadas'

"

Casey v.Cincinnati Typographical Union (45 Fed.
135) came before the United States Circuit Court in 1890,
on an application by the plaintiff, proprietor and publisher of the Comonwealth, a weekly paper published at

Covington, Ky., for an injunction restraining the boycott
which the defendants had declared against him for refusing to

"unionize" his office, i.e. employ only union

men at union prices.

The purpose of the boycott was
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to destroy the circulation of the newspaper arid its
It was conducted by

vilue as an advertising medium.
circulating handbills
Union

the

in

and publishing notices

calling upon workingmen and

Bulletin of Cincinnati

all friends of organized labor to withdraw their patronage from Mr.

Casey's business,

to merchants

requesting

and by sending

circulars

then to withdraw their

scriptions and advertisements

from the

sub-

Comionwealth as a

condition of retaining the good will and patronage of
organized labor.
The temporary

and the publication of

both the boycott
circulars,
threats

although

restraining

injunction was granted

the notices and

there had been no violence

to do anything unlawful.
Old Dominion SteamshipCo.,v. McKenna,

Fed.

and no

48), 1887,

was held that

it

et

al. (30

where the defendants,

styling themselves the "Executive Board of the Ocean
Association of the Longshoremen's
obtaining

such a

rate of wages

cdared a boycott of the plaintiff's
tempted to prevent

as

Union,

for the purpose

they demanded,

business,

de-

and at-

the plaintiff from carrying on its

business as a cornon car'rier,

and endeavored to stop all

dealings of other persons with the plaintiff,

by sending

of
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threatening notices to its

various customers and patrons

intimidate them and deter them from having

designed to

any dealings with the
only illegal,

plaintiff

; such acts were not

rendering the defendants liable in

damages,

comnon law as well as by Sec.,

but also misdemeanors at

168 of the Penal Code of New York State.
Brace Bros., v.Evans
grew out of an attempt

(3 R. and Corp. Law J. 561)

of the Knights of Labor to force

the plaintiffs, managers of a steam laundry at Wilkinsburg,

Pa.,

discharged.

to reinstate

certain employes

whom

they had

After their refusal to comply, circulars

were issued alleging abusive treatment

of the employes

by the plaintiffs and asking all persons to cease patronizing them.
large

letters

Some of the circulars were printed in
"Boycott Brace Bros.

"

Their customers

were sought out and asked not to patronize them.
followed plaintiff's

wagons in

attached to the harnesses
admonition

buggies,

having banners

on either side,

"Boycott Brace Bros."

bearing the

When the plaintiff's

agents refused to cease to represent them,
themselves boycotted.

Men

they were

Noisy crowds assembled around
until the police were

their doors destributing

circulars,

obliged to interfere.

The agents of plaintiffs were
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them.

finally obliged to decline to represent
their customer&-withdrew

Many of

their patronage and the loss to

their business from boycott was $600.00 per week.
A preliminary injuction was granted restraining
the conduct of the boycotters.
State v. Glidden .
et al (55

Glidden

Conn.

47.),

came before the Supreme

in

1887,

on an appeal from error

Court of Connecticut,

court on conviction of the defendant

of the superior

for unlawful conspiracy.
defendants,

The leading case of State v.

members

A new trial

was refused.

of a typographical union,

The

had noti-

fied the Carrington Publishing Co. of New Haven, publishers of the Journal and Courrier newspaper,

to dis-

charge their employees and to hire the defendants
their associates

of the union instead.

threatened them that,
quest,

was affiliated

if

by inducing

advertisers and others to withdraw their
They also warned the company that the union

patronage.

city,all

They had

upon non-compliance with the re-

they would boycott their business

subscribers,

and

with other unions and associations

of whom would unite in

of the

boycotting the company

they did not yield to the defendants'

demand.

was testimony that the defendants endeavored

There

to induce
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and compel others to withdraw theirrIpatronage from the
company, and that Glidden had distributed circulars,
printed in large letters
ficient

: "A word to the wise is suf--

; boycott the Journal and Courrier".

The

defendants had also declared that the Carrington Company
would have to pay the expenses of the boycott.
court

The

held that these acts fell within the prohibition

of the statute of 1878 which provides that "Every person
who shall threaten or use any means to intimidate any
person, to compel such person against his will, to do
or abstain from doing any acts which such person had a
legal right to do, or shall persistently follow such persons in a disorderly manner, or injure or threaten to
injure his property with intent to intimidate him, shall
upon conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding $100.,
or imprisonment in the county jail for six months."
The court said, inter alia

; "Defendants' purpose was

to deprive the publishing company of its liberty to
carry on its own bl]siness in its own way, although in
doing so it interferred with no right of the defendants.
The motive was to gain an advantage unjustly and at the
expense of others and therefore it was l egally corrupt.
As a means of accomplishing the purpose the parties

in-
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it

tended to harm the publishing company and therefore

after quoting Mr.McCarthy's

The. court,

was malicious.,,

explanation of the origin of the term"boycott"

if

said that the word signified violence,

above,

as given
not

and that there would be no doubt of the criminal

murder,

intent if

original sense.

The

preferred to believe

that

its

the word was used in

court added,

however,

the word was used in
meaning,and

that if

that it

a modified sense and with a milder
thus used it

might not have been

cr iminal.
In another Connecticut case, Com
lace,

(10 N. Y. St.

Bar Ass.

defendants, superintendents

158.),

v.

Opdyke and Wal-

the court found the

of two railroads,

guilty of

the common law offence of conspiracy for entering into a
mutual agreement

to use all their influence to prevent

objectionable

any person

to either defendant,

from

obtaining employment with either railroad company.
Con.

v.

0'Keef,

(10 N.Y.St.

was a late Massachusetts

Bar Ass.160.):

This

case which arose on an indict-

ment against 0'Keef and other members of the Knights of
Labor for conspiracy to boycott Harrington & Co.,
maniufacturers,

leather

by compelling or inducing one Emery,

through his employees, not to purchase any leather of
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Harrington & Co. not manufactured by the work of
Knights of Labor.

Chief Justice Brigham, in his charge

to the jury, after defining the equal rights of workmen
to control their own labor and of manufacturers to conduct their own business as they please, says

:

"Such

being the respective rights of laborers, employers and
manufacturers, any interference of
stated rights of the other,

either with the

by fraudulent or forcible

means, that is to say, means that were physically controlling and coercive, or morally

controlling and coer-

cive, by reason of a personal or official influence
which the persons using that influence
could use upon the persons

knew that they

to whom they intended to ap-

ply that influence, so that it would have the force and
effect

of coercion and compulsion, in whatever form of

words that compulsion should be expressed, would be unlawful and criminal ; and if two or more persons combined to use such means they would be guilty of a criminal conspiracy.
The

state of Minnesota has taken a more lenient

attitude toward strikes and boycotts than any of the
other states.
Hollis,

In the recent case of Bohn Mfg.Co.v.

(54 Minn.223),

the court said

that any man
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(unless under contract obligation, or unless his employment charges him with sane public duty) has a
right to refuse to work for or to deal with any man or
class of men, as he sees fit

;

and this right, which

one man may exercise singly any number may agree to
exercise jointly.
The Pulman Boycott : The Pulman Boycott
v. Debs supra.)

(see U.S.

surpassed all previous efforts of labor
It

organizations in the vastness of its proportions.

brought the conspiracy of boycotting squarely before the
United States Courts, and gave them a chance to brand it
unmistakably with their disapproval, and condemnation.
In Thomas v.Railway Co. supra.,

the views of the Federal

courts in regard to the boycott features of the great
Pulman strike are well expressed by Judge Taft.

He

said : "The combination was unlawful without respect
to the contract feature.

It was a boycott.

The em-

ployes of the railway companies had no gruevance against
their employers.

Handling and hauling Pulman cars did

not render the ir service any more burdensome.

They had

no complaint against the use of Pulman cars, as cars.
They came into no natural relation with Pulman in hand-
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ling the cars.

He paid them no wages.

regulate their hours or in

He did not

any way determine

their ser-

Simply to injure him in his business,

vices.

incited and encouraged to compel the railway

they were

companies

to withdraw custom from him by threats of quitting their
service,

and by actually quitting their. service.

They

inflicted a loss upon the companies that was very great,
and it was unlawful because it was without

lawful

excuse.
All the employes had a right
ment,

to quit their employw-

but they had no right to combine to quit in

order

thereby to compel their employer to withdraw from a
mutually profitable relation with a third person,

when

the relation thus sought to be broken had no effect
whatever on the character or reward of their service.
It

is

the motive for quitting and the end sought thereby

that makes the injury inflicted unlawful,
bination by which it
The distinction

is

between

and the com-

effected an unlawful conspiracy.
an ordinary

lawful and peaceable

strike entered upon to obtain concessions in
the
one,

strikers employment

and a boycott

is

the terms of

no fanciful

or one which needs the power of fine distinction to
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determine which is which.

Every laboring man recognizes

the one or the other as quickly as the lawyer or the
judge.

The combination under discussion was a boycott.

x x x Boycotts though unaccompanied by violence or intimidation have been pronounced unlawful in every state
of the United States where the question has arisen,
unless it be Minnesota ; and they are held to be unlawful in England."
The cases which have come before the federal courts
have been serious and the language of the decisions is
correspondingly strong.

It will be noted that all boy-

cotts which have come under the cognizance of the courts
have been accompanied by intimidation ,either physical or'
moral, and their condemnation by the courts has been
grounded mainly on these unlawful means of enforcement.
It may be impossible for a boycott to be enforced without the use of intimidation or threats of sane kind or degree.

But the courts of New York,Connecticut and Massa-

chusetts have intimated, and the court of Minnesota has
plainly asserted, that ifsa boycott should be declared
by workingmen against their employer to obtain some just
concession,and should be conducted by persuasion and
other peaceable means, without intimidation,physical or
moral,such boycott would not be unlawful.
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The boycott has beenas yetthe

Statutes :
ject of but little
is

expressed legislation,

sub-

though there

pressing need that the offence be clearly defined.

The following states,

however,

declare it a criminal

offence either by specific reference to it or by statutes
against threats and intimidation
New Hampshire,

New York,

Island, South Dakota,

: Colorado,

North Dakota,

Texas,

Illionois,

Oregon,

Rhode

Vermont and Wisconsin.
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Chapter IV.
R F M E D I E S.

Section 1.

At Law :
at law or in

There is

Civil Remedies.

no civil remedy either

equity against

a workman who quits his em-

ployment or a master who discharges his workman,
this is

done in

the parties.
ployment

violation of a contract

existing between

If there is a contract for labor and em-

existing between the parties,

the other in

unless

each is

liable to

a civil action for any damages resulting

from a violation of that contratt,

(Anson on Contracts,

etc.)
In England it

was laid down in

Lumley v. Guy(2 F. & B.

(Q.

B.),)

the noted case of

that an action for

damages wouldlie for enticing away a servant or enducing
a workman to break his contract

of employment.

This

doctrine has been followed in many subsequent English
cases and may be said to be the law in England.
doctrine has been much questioned in
much narrowed in

its

The

this country and

application.

The cases in most of the states are now agreed that
no act ion will lie for indtucing the breach of a contract
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of employment

by peaceable and lawful means but that

where workmen combine to coerce their employer unlawfully,

or where they

employ threats,

intimidation,

or violence to compel workmen to leave their

employment,

or to prevent them from entering into employment,
are liable in

a civil action for all damages

they

resulting

(Cooley on Torts 2nd,

fran such unlawful conduct.
p.

force,

Ed.

581 ; Pollo ck on Torts, 2nd, Ed. p. 452 ; Harvester

Co.,

v.Meinhardt,

People v.Kostka,

60 Haw.
4 N. Y.

Pr.

168 ; 9 Abb.

Crim.

Rep.

429

N.

C. 393

; Rogers v.

Evarts, 17 N. Y. Sup. 264 ; Com. v Hunt supra.; Walker
v. Cronin,

107 Mass.

553 ; State v. Stewart,

Payne v.Railroad Co.,
15 S.

W. Rep.

49 Am.

R. 666

& N. M. Ry.

Thomas v. Ry.

Co.,

Co.,

62 Fed.

273

; Chambers v.Baldwin

57 ; Bouler v. Macauley,

Toledo A. A.

59 Vt.

v, Penn.

15 S.

W. Rep.

60

Co.,

54 Fed.

730;

803).

Where the losses of the employer are incidental to
the lawful acts of the strikers

it

is

damnum absgue

injuria and the strikers are not answerable.
however,

the strike is

in

When,

the nature of a boycott and

designed primarily to injure the employer or third
parties,

then the strikers are answerable

in

damages.
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.A

in

boycott being a conspiracy designed to injure another
his trade or business,

civil action will

and being as such unlawful,

lie against

the boycotters for any

damages resulting therefpvm.

(Old Dominion S.

V. McKenna 30 Fed.

48 ; Moores & Co.

23 Weekly L.

48 ; People v. Wilzig,

Rep.
A.

403

Bul.

; Thomas v. Railway

A. & N. M. Ry.

In

qity

Co.,

:

Co.,

v. Penn.

a

v. Bricklayers'

Co.,
Union,

4 N. Y. Crim.

62 Fed.
Co.,

S.

803

54 Fed.

; Toledo
730).

Of late years equity has been much

appealed to for the remedy of injunction against strikes
and boycotts.

The injunction has been granted where-

ever the strikes were being conducted unlawfully and the
injuries resulting therefrom
as could not be

were continuous,

and such

compensated in a civil action for

damages.
Writs of injunction were refused to the petitioners
in

Harvester Co., v. Meinhardt

.

and

ogers v.

Evarts supraon the ground that no intimidation or violence accompanied the strikes to render them unlawful.
Injunctions were granted restraining boycotts
Bros.,v Evans;

in Brace

Casey v Cincinnati Typographical Union;
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and Moore v Bricklarers' Union ; reviewed above.
In
tion it

United States v.

orkingtnens'

Amalgamated AssoGia-

was held that an injunction would lie against

the strikers who by violence and intimidation were
forcing a discontinuance. of business,

including the

transportation of goods from state to state.
In

the United States v.Debs supra.,

an injunction

was granted against the Pulman strikers enjoining the
officers and members of the American Railway Union and
all other persons from interfering with the
the mails or obstructing and restraining
This action of the Circuit

commerce.

carriage of

interstate

Court was ap-

proved by the United States Supreme Court

in

the case

of In re Debs suipa.
In Toledo,A.
al.

A.&

(54 Fed. 746),

March 29, 1893.,

N. WeRya

Co.,_v.,Penn,

Co.,,et

in Circuit Court for N.D. of Ohio,

it is decided that where

ganization has declared a

boycott againtt

a labor ora railroad,

and connecting roads are therefore refusing or seem about
to refuse,
road,

in

to afford equal facilities

violation of section 3,

merce act,
injunction,

to the boycotted
of the interstate

com-

they may be compelled to do so by mandatory
since the case is

urgent,

the rights of the
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parties free from reasonable doubt,

and the duty sought

to be enforced is

Such mandatory in-

junction is

imposed by law.

the officers and employes of

binding on all

the respondent

railroad, having proper notice thereof,

whether they be made parties or not.

And an engineer,

who, while still remaining in the Employ
dent

company,

respondent

refuses to attach to his train a car of the

company as commanded by the injunction,

guilty of comtempt of court,
In
the

this same

court

of the respon-

held

case,
that

and punis'hable

(54 Fed.,
a

is

accordingly.

730,

combination

to

induce

and procure the officers of a coimion carrier corporation,
subject to the interstate
tive engineers,

commerce act,

to refuse to receive,

interstate freight

and its

handle and haul

from another like common carrier in

order to injure the latter

is

a conpiracy to commit

misdemeanor under the interstate commerce act,
inal.

locomo-

a

and crim-

Here the court granted a preliminary injunction

against Mr.

Arthur,

tive Engineers,

Chief of the Brotherhood of Locomo-

to re st rain him from giving any order

or signal for carrying out the unlawvful objects of the
conspiracy,

and held that the court may issue a manda-

tory injunction

compel li~g him to rescind such unlaw ful

109
order already issued,

especially where the necessary

effect of the order or signal is to induce flagrant
violations of an injunction previously

issued by the

coutt.
A Court of Equity will enjoin any attempt of
strikers to interfere with the management

of a road in

control of a receiver acting under order of the court,
and will. punish as contempt any such interferancp,
(Thomas v. Railway Co.,

supra.

; Toledo A. A. & N. M.

R_ . Co.,

supra

; Union Trust Co., v.

v. Penn.,

Co.,

Atchison T. & S. F.

Ry.

Co.

The equitable remedy of
extreme application in

injunction received an

the case of Farmer'sLoan and

v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.,

Fruit Co.,
803).

64 Fed. 724).

( 60 Fed.

Here the United States Circuit Court sus-

tained an injunction restraining the employes

of a re-

ceiver operating a railroad, under order of the court,
from going out on a proposed strike against a propose.
reduction of wages.

It

was also held that the court

may grant an injunction against the executive heads of
of railroad eniployes

the various

labor organizations

rest raining

them from ordering a strike of the

snployes
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The court justified the injunctions on

of. a receiver.

the alleged grounds that the proposed strike was designed to cripple and embarrass the operation of the
and that strikes were

road by the officer of the court,
always accompanied

by disorder and violence and were

necessarily unlawful.
The extreme use of the injunction in this case
It has received much adverse crit-

has no precedent.

icism by the legal profession

; and

it

remains yet to

be seen whether other courts will follow this decision,
and carry the propositions here
logical conclusions.

laid down to their

The decision

is

ana

a bold one,

presses hard upon the boundary line which separates the
powers of the courts fran the cherished rights and liberties of individuals.

Section 2.

Penal Remedies.

Whenever the conspiracy
ers is

declared

criminal by the common law,

or by United States statutes,
timidation,

of the strikers or boycott-

or wherever threats,

force or violence have

onnrnt.

punishable
(See

all

by indictment,
the

in-

been re sorted to to

further the purposes of the conspiracy,
are all

or by state

the conspirators

and by fine or

cases reviewed above.)

impris-
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When strikers disregard and disobey an injunction
of the court restraining their conduct,

or when they in-

terfere unlawfully with the operation of a road by a receiver acting under order of the court,
ishable for contempt.
Co.

v.

Penn.

U. S.

v.

S.

F.

Ry.

N.

Pac.

Co.,

supra"

(Toledo A. A. & N. M. Ry.
Thomas v.

Debs, §upra ; Union Trust Co.
Co.

Ry.

they are pun-

Ry.
v.

Co.

Atchison T.

supra ; Farmer's Loan & Trust Co.
Co.

supra.)

supra;

v.

&
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CONCLUSIONS.

As a result of this examination of the leading
American cases, involving strikesA we conclude that in
of whatever rank,

America the workingman,

has

complete

All state

liberty in the disposition of his labor.

statutes and courts recognize the rights of the laborer
to work for whom,
refuse to work,
tions for all

and for what wages,

as he pleases.

benefibent

he pleases,

or to

Workmen may form associa-

and lawful purposes.

They may

lawfully meet together to consult for the promotion of
their own interests.

They may enter into agreements

and

combinations for the advancement or preservation of their
or for the reduction of the hours of labor,

wages,

altering

by peaceable

or for

and lawful means any of the con-

ditions of their employment.

They may enforce upon the

members of the association by fine or expulsion any of the
lawful rules adopted by the society,

and to which the

member has given a voluntary assent.
If

not boun

by contract,

they may agree together

and quit work in a body when they please,
ring either civil or criminal liability,
in

quitting is

without
if

incur-

their purpose

to promote their own legitimate

interests,
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as the reduction of hours or the advancement of wages.
It is otherwise, however, if the purpose of the combination and quitting is to violate a contract, or a statute,
to force employers to discharge other workmen or to break
their mutual contracts with third parties.
The laws both state and federal condemn all conspiracies intended primarily to boycott or injure third parsties.

They condemn the use of intimidation by these con-

spiracies for any purpose.
Having the right to combine for the promotion of
their interests, or to quit their employment, they have a
right to use all peaceable arguments and persuasion to
induce others to join their society, or to quit their
employment,

or to refrain from entering the employment

which the strikers have abandoned.

They may pay the

expenses or losses of other workmen as an inducement to
them to leave their employment and join the strike.
this they may lawfully do, as Judge Barrett says

All

:

"Persuasion, argument, entreaty are legitimate methods.
But all attempts of combinations of workingmen to
compel the employer to alter the conduct of his trade or
business or to dictate the number or character of his
employes

;

to compel him to discharge some men or to
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to employ others

or to compel any workman outside

;

combination to leave his employment,

or to prevent his

working for whom or for what wages he pleases,
otherwise

interfering with him in

the

or

the enjoyment of his

personal liberty, if these ends are sought to be accomplished by threats,
are illegal,

coercion,

intimidation or violence,

and the combination is

a criminal

conspiracy.

Such combinations are wrongful as interferences- with
personal

liberty anddas

restraints of trade and commerce.

A combination of workingmen which has for its purpose or for its necessary result to interfere with the
carriage
commerce,

of the mail or to control or restrain interstate
is

held by the United States Courts

criminal conspiracy.

to be a

And any attempt by workingmen to

interfere, by the use of intimidation or force, with the
operation of a railroad by a receiver under orders of a
federal court,
The

is

helfi to be a contempt of

intimidation here condemned by

court.

the courts need

not consist of actual threats or violence but may arise
from an attitude of menace,

which has the effect of

either physical or moral coercion.

No boycott,

fran such intimidation has come before the
the decisions

in

free

courts,

New Yort and some other states

but

intimate
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that a boycott for a lawful purpose, and

not accompanied

by such intimidation would not be unlawful.
An action will lie against the members of the conspiracy for all

damages resulting directly fran an un-

lawful strike or boycott.
either in

its

purpose or its

If

the

conspiracy is

means of enforcernent,

members are punishable by indictment.
will use all

criminal,
its

Courts of equity

their power to restrain unlawful strikes

and boycotts by injunction.

They will punish as con-

tdmpt any wilful disobedience of their orders.

